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ABSTRACT
Over the last 20 years the number of annual accidents in general aviation has seen
a steady decline. The annual number of fatal accidents, however, has remained relatively
stable. Adverse weather is consistently cited as a leading cause of fatal accidents in
general aviation; weather accidents have a fatality rate nearly four times that of other
general aviation accidents. Reviews of accident data reveal that often these accidents
occur when inexperienced pilots who are certified only for visual flight rules flight
continue into adverse weather. The Situation Assessment Hypothesis suggests these
accidents occur when pilots fail to accurately recognize weather conditions they are
facing. Cue-based training has been suggested as an effective method for improving
situation assessment. A detailed analysis of the ways cue-based training affects decisionmaking behavior is needed to better understand the training’s effectiveness.
This research aims to first analyze the way pilots of varying experience levels
view weather scenes and make weather-related decisions.

Second, it endeavors to

quantify the effects of cue-based training on weather-related decision making both in
terms of decision accuracy and visual scan behavior. Beyond weather-related decision
making, this study provides a methodology for evaluating experience and training that
could be extended to any type of primarily visual task.
Findings of the research indicated clear differences between pilots and non-pilots
with minor differences seen between pilots of different experience levels. Non-pilot
scanpaths consisted of many shorter fixations spread over a longer period of time
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compared to pilots’ scanpaths. High-time pilots made their first fixation more quickly
while directing fewer fixations to areas of cloud darkness than low-time pilots.
While the training program failed to improve decision accuracy, it successfully
affected a more conservative bias in groups, thereby reducing the number of simulated
flights into adverse weather. What’s more, the training reduced the amount of visual
information needed to make a decision in all groups, with largest effects seen among nonpilots. This suggests the training program was effective and should be implemented early
in the pilots’ career in order to achieve the maximum benefit.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even
greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness,
incapacity or neglect.”
- Captain A. G. Lamplugh
From 1987-2006 there were 39,199 reported accidents in general aviation (GA),
7,611 of which involved fatalities (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2007).
While the number of accidents declined each year during this period, the number of
yearly fatal accidents remained stable. Weather is consistently involved in a large
percentage of these fatal accidents (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA],
2005).
Of GA weather accidents, the majority occur when pilots who are certified to fly
only according to visual flight rules (VFR) continue flight into instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC). Under VFR pilots can fly in conditions in which the aircraft can be
controlled by visual reference to the environment outside the cockpit. Specific weather
minimums in terms of visibility and cloud ceiling have been established to ensure that
pilots can control their aircrafts. Weather conditions below these established minimums
are considered instrument meteorological conditions. VFR into IMC accidents have been
shown to result in at least one fatality 75% of the time, compared to 18% for other types
of GA accidents (Wiegmann & Goh, 2000).

What’s more, these accidents should
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technically never happen as they involve pilots flying in conditions for which they are not
certified.
The majority of GA accidents, especially VFR into IMC accidents, are a result of
pilot performance, as opposed to mechanical or structural failures (O’Hare, Wiggins,
Batt, & Morrison, 1994). There is strong evidence suggesting that pilots continue into
IMC because they fail to recognize the severity of the conditions ahead of them (Goh &
Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002). Further, several studies show that
given the same written information about a flight, pilots tend to make consistent,
predictable decisions (Driskoll, 1998; Hunter, 2003). This suggests that pilots must have
trouble gathering and identifying weather conditions accurately.

Experience and Decision Making
Flight experience is consistently cited as a primary factor in weather related
accidents in both accident investigation studies (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002; O’Hare &
Owen, 2002; Conway, Mode, Berman, Martin, & Hill, 2005) and experimental studies
(Coyne, Baldwin, & Latorella, 2008; Wiggins, 2003; Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002).
While correlations between experience and safer performance are expected, the
relationship seems stronger with weather accidents than with other types of GA accidents
(Goh & Wiegmann, 2001).
A recent study by Wiggins and Bollwerk compared different information
acquisition strategies to determine how they affect decision making among pilots (2006).
Several strategies were taught and tested, but in the end, task-related experience proved
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to be more important in decision making than acquisition strategy. Another study
presented subjects with a series of computer-based flight scenarios.

The computer

tracked the information subjects accessed while making their flight decisions (Wiggins &
O’Hare, 1995). Their results showed that high-flight time pilots were able to make
correct decisions quicker, using less information, and with a lower rate of information
recursion than low-time pilots. A 2003 study drew similar conclusions, finding that
experienced pilots reported using fewer cues to make weather decisions (Wiggins &
O'Hare, 2003). Thus, experience does seem to affect a pilot’s ability to accurately
acquire information.

Training and Decision Making
Research suggests that situation awareness is a primary factor involved in pilots
continued flight into IMC conditions (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). Studies also point to
training as the best method for improving situational assessment (Gaba, 1995). Among
training methodologies, cue-based training has established itself as a viable method for
training decision making in many industries including: emergency response (Ash &
Smallman, 2008); aviation (Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003); cognitive rehabilitation
(Hampstead, Sathian, Moore, Nalisnick, & Stringer, 2008); medicine (Jenkins, Shields,
Patterson, & Kee, 2007); and law enforcement (Santarcangelo, Cribbie, & Hubbard,
2004). Cue-based training identifies and teaches specific cues that signify a change in
system state and that require a specific response (Smith, Giffin, Rockwell, & Thomas,
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1986).

One such program, WeatherWise, has been developed specifically to teach

weather-related decision making (Wiggins, 1999).
WeatherWise was developed through a series of research studies aimed at
understanding how pilots make weather decisions. Interviews with expert pilots were
used to identify the key features of weather available to pilots as they make weather
related decisions (Wiggins & O'Hare 2003). An online survey was then created to allow
pilots to rate the importance of each cue. From the results of the study, it was identified
that the presence of three or more cues indicated that pilots should divert from their flight
path. These studies thus served as the basis for the creation of a training program. An
initial test of the program was completed by a group of pilots in 2003. The study found
that the program increased the pilots’ subjective importance ratings of all nine weather
cues. Further, pilots who received the training condition outperformed the control group
on a decision making task involving a simulated flight. While the program increased the
pilots’ subjective importance ratings for weather cues, a more thorough analysis of its
effectiveness is needed.

Insights from Eye Tracking
The literature has established that differences exist in the performance of lowtime and high-time pilots when making weather-related decisions. While some studies
have examined what information pilots deem important to decision making, little has
been done to quantify the ways pilots visually gather this information. Eye tracking
technology can offer keen insights into this area.
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It has been well established that eye movements and interest are highly correlated
(Starker, 1990). A person’s foveal vision is concentrated to a very small proportion of
their total visual field; therefore, to gather visual information about a part of a scene a
person must direct their gaze to that point (Duchowski, 2003). The points to which a
person directs their gaze are directly related to the task being performed (Henderson,
Brockmole et al., 2007). Interestingly, it has been shown that people are sometimes
unaware of the location of their fixations and the visual information they are gathering
(Qvarfodt & Zhai, 2005). Thus, valuable information regarding the parts of an image that
are deemed relevant to the task at hand can be obtained by reviewing the locations of
visual fixations (Land, Van Gompel et al., 2007). This technology can, therefore, be
applied to weather-related decision making to shed light on the information acquisition
process.

Purpose
The research has thus established that pilots’ continued flight into adverse
weather is a significant problem that warrants further research. More specifically, there
is a notable lack of research regarding the way pilots gather weather information. This
study will therefore aim to address this problem. Pilots will be presented with a series of
weather scenes on an eye-tracking computer monitor. As they review each scene to
decide if the conditions pictured meet VFR minimums, the computer will track their eye
movements. As eye movements are tightly linked to cognitive processes (Toet, 2006),
the pilots’ scanpaths will provide novel insight into weather-related decision making. As

5

both training and experience have been suggested to affect the way pilots gather
information, both will be analyzed to see how they affect the decision making process.
In the end, it is hoped that the insights gained from this study will provide a
foundation for understanding how pilots make weather-related decisions. From this
foundation, more effective training programs could be developed. This study will also
demonstrate a method for objectively analyzing the effectiveness of training programs.
Eye tracking data will show whether or not the training program actually changes the
subject’s behavior. Through analysis of the training program, suggested improvements
will be discussed. Ultimately, the goal of this study is to learn how to better train pilots
to make accurate weather related decisions.

Research Contributions
The research completed in this study aims to provide three main contributions.
The first involves offering novel insights into the behavior of pilots encountering adverse
weather. The study is the first to use eye tracking as a method for understanding how
pilots view weather scenes. Specifically, the study investigates the way flight experience
affects pilots’ information acquisition strategies. This comparison represents a novel
contribution to the body of research on aviation decision making.
The second major contribution of this work is a new methodology for analyzing
the effectiveness of training programs.

Traditionally training programs have been

evaluated based on performance tests; this methodology goes a step further to analyze
capture changes in behavior. The use of eye tracking to measure the effects of training in
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a study of this size has never been completed. This methodology could easily be applied
to any other primarily visual task.
The final major contribution of this study addresses cognition and visual attention.
There is evidence that people are often unaware of the visual information that they
collect. While this has been noted in research, it has not been satisfactorily investigated.
This study directly addresses the question of awareness by comparing the parts of an
image subjects identified as important with the subjects’ actual visual fixations. The
degree of agreement between these two items will show how well the perceived
importance of visual features matches the actual visual scanpath behavior. Differences
in agreement levels based on task experience will also be interesting to observe. The
results could provide strong evidence for the importance of tracking eye movements as a
means to provide insights beyond traditional data collection techniques.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Aviation Overview
Throughout history humankind has been captivated by flight. From the stories of
Icarus and Daedulus in Greek mythology to Leonardo da Vinci’s conceptual designs for
flying machines, the desire to fly seems almost innate. This fascination has led many to
pursue flight with varying degrees of success. It was not until the Wright brothers’
historic flight in Kitty Hawk, NC on December 14, 1903, however, that the modern era of
air travel was truly ushered in.
Since that historic flight, aviation has continued to grow and expand. Indeed,
aviation has established itself as a primary mode of transportation for both people and
goods. For example, in 2007, 647 million passenger trips were flown on 7.4 million
commercial flights to 267 airports in the U.S. (Sherry & Donohue, 2008). In the same
year, pilots on non-commercial, GA flights logged nearly 24 million flight hours (NTSB,
2007). What’s more, these numbers merely represent a snapshot in time, as the aviation
industry is expected to grow significantly over the coming years.

Early Years of Aviation Safety
This increased reliance on aviation, however, has not come without cost. Indeed
from the very beginning, aviation was recognized as potentially dangerous as the Wright
brothers suffered many hard landings and crashes during the development of their
aircraft. Nevertheless, it was not until September 17, 1908 that a truly tragic event
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occurred. Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge was flying as the passenger on a test flight
piloted by Orville Wright when one of the plane’s propellers shattered. The plane
quickly plummeted 100 feet, crashing hard into the ground killing Lieutenant Selfridge
and badly injuring Orville (New York Times, 1908). This accident would turn out to be
the first of many fatal accidents in aviation.
Perhaps the earliest proponent of safety in aviation was the U.S. Air Mail Service.
By 1924, airmail had become popular enough to merit 24-hour flight service between
New York and San Francisco. Rigorous safety programs were implemented to maintain
this level of service, including strict requirements for pilots, routine medical
examinations, and meticulous inspections of aircraft after nearly every flight. The results
of these safety measures speak for themselves. Fatality rates associated with U.S. Air
Mail Service were estimated at one fatality per 789,000 miles flown, which stood in stark
contrast to the rate of one fatality per 13,500 miles flown for the rest of commercial
aviation (Hansen, McAndrews, & Berkely, 2005). The causes of the alarmingly high
fatality rate in commercial aviation were numerous.
In the early years of aviation a large proportion of accidents could reasonably be
attributed to the aircraft being flown (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). This was often the
result of poor machine design or mechanical failure. However, as the aviation industry
matured, significant advances in technology and safety occurred, resulting in dramatic
declines in the rate of accidents. This significant improvement in safety between 1945
and 1985 can be seen in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: International Air Carrier Fatality Rates (International Civil Aviation
Organization [ICAO], 2005)
Recent General Aviation Accident Trends
While aviation is widely considered one of the safest forms of transportation, this
is not true for all types of aviation. For instance, a distinction can be made between air
carrier and general aviation (GA), with each having their own set of regulations. Air
carrier aviation refers to scheduled, non-scheduled, commuter, and on-demand
commercial flights, while GA refers to all other types of aviation.
These distinct classifications have shown a considerable difference in safety
levels. In 2007 alone, the NTSB reported that GA accidents were associated with 94.7%
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of accidents overall and 91.7% of those involving fatalities; yet only 50.5% of civil
aviation flight hours were flown under 14 CFR Part 91 – GA (NTSB, 2007). This is
equivalent to an accident rate in general aviation that is 17.5 times higher than in
commercial aviation; clearly a considerable difference.
This is not to say that improvements in GA safety have not occurred. Indeed, over
the past 20 years, GA accident rates have continued to decline. From 1987-2006 there
were 39,199 reported accidents in GA. Of these, 7,611 involved fatalities. As presented
in Figure 2, there has been a decreasing trend in the overall number of accidents.
However, the fatal accident rate has remained relatively steady for the last 20 years.
These trends are evident whether one considers frequency or the rate of accidents per
100,000 flight hours.

Accidents

2,500

Fatal Accidents
2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0
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1990

1993
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2005

Figure 2: General Aviation Accidents from 1987-2006 (NTSB)
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It would appear then that if the GA accident rate is to be reduced further, efforts
should be aimed specifically at reducing fatal accidents. There are many factors that
contribute to these accident rates. For example, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association categorizes accidents into ten types: pre-flight taxi, takeoff/climb, fuel
management, weather, other cruise, descent/approach, go-around, maneuvering, landing,
and other (Table 1).
Table 1: General Aviation Accident Types for 2004 (AOPA, 2005)
Total
3.60%
15.70%
1.80%
3.80%
5.70%
39.80%
9.70%
12.70%
4.50%
2.70%

Preflight/Taxi
Takeoff/Climb
Other Cruise
Go-Around
Descent/Approach
Landing
Maneuvering
Fuel Management
Weather
Other

Fatal
0.00%
15.80%
4.00%
2.60%
15.30%
4.00%
22.80%
7.00%
19.70%
8.80%

As can be seen, while adverse weather is associated with only 4.5% of the GA
accidents, it accounts for nearly 20% of those involving fatalities. Furthermore, of the 48
weather accidents in 2004, an alarming 45 were associated with fatalities, a rate of
93.75% (AOPA, 2005). These data suggest that to significantly decrease the fatal
accident rate in GA, weather-related accidents should be addressed.

Weather and General Aviation
Within GA, all flights operate under either VFR or instrument flight rules (IFR).
Visual flight rules are a set of defined aviation regulations under which a pilot may
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operate an aircraft in areas where the meteorological conditions (i.e., VFR minimums)
are above specified limits based on two primary factors: visibility and the distance below,
above, and horizontally from clouds. Specific VFR minimums vary somewhat based on
the class of airspace (e.g., Class A, B, C, D, etc.), the time of day, and the flight altitude.
However, the majority of GA flights occur in class G airspace that require one statute
mile of visibility and a clearance of 500 ft. from the ground, 1,000 ft. above, and 2,000 ft.
horizontally from the clouds (Federal Aviation Regulation [FAR] 91.155).
When flying under VFR it is the pilot’s responsibility to see and avoid any
potential problems. This is the most basic type of flight as it requires only the lowest
level of flight certification and an airworthy aircraft. In a VFR flight the pilot relies
primarily on what he sees out the windows of the aircraft to direct his flight. Therefore,
minimum weather conditions are required to ensure the pilot is able to safely operate their
aircraft. Once the conditions degrade beyond VFR minimums, pilots must either divert
from their flight path or continue under IFR. These degraded conditions are called
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

IFR requires pilots to have instrument

flight certification, a better equipped aircraft, and a filed flight plan (FAR 91.169). Even
with these regulations, however, weather remains a consistent contributor to GA
accidents.
Weather-related accident rates have not changed appreciably over the past 20
years.

From 1983-2004 weather accidents accounted for between 5% - 9% of all

accidents (NTSB, 2005). While these percentages are relatively low, they account for
around 25% of all GA fatalities. Research has shown that of weather-related fixed-wing
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GA accidents, between 80% - 90% involved pilots operating under VFR that flew into
IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002; Coyne, et al., 2008).

For example, consider the

following accident case:
On March 14, 2003, about 1250 Eastern Standard Time, a Cessna
177, N3275T, registered to and operated by a private pilot, collided into
mountainous terrain in Old Fort, North Carolina. The personal flight was
operated under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91 with no flight plan
filed.
A review of audio air traffic control records revealed the pilot
contacted an Asheville ground controller about 1224 and stated he
intended to fly at 4,500 feet [mean sea level] and he received Alpha, the
current Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) report. The pilot
told the ground controller his approximate on-course heading would be
due east, "but I want to be sure that I don't get into the clouds going over
the mountains." The controller stated, "if you need to deviate around
weather or something, just let me or departure know." The pilot
acknowledged, and the controller stated, "[ATIS] Alpha is showing that
the cloud layer is two-thousand-five-hundred overcast now. It's been
lowering a little bit all day." The pilot replied, "Yeah, I was aware of
that." At 1233, the flight was cleared for takeoff.
About 1241, the controller advised the pilot, "you're eight miles
northeast of the Asheville airport, radar contact is lost. You can squawk

14

VFR, frequency change approved." The pilot stated, "thank you very
much. We're following interstate forty ..." The controller provided the
frequency for Atlanta Center, and no further radio or radar contact was
made with the flight. After the airplane was reported overdue, an air and
ground search was initiated. On March 15, 2003, about 0800, an air
search party located the wreckage in a heavily wooded area near the top
of Kitsuma Peak in the Pisgah National Forest, 18 nautical miles east of
Asheville Regional Airport. There was no evidence of mechanical failure.
(NTSB Report ID: ATL03FA061)
This case represents a typical accident in which a pilot on a VFR flight plan
continued to fly into adverse weather conditions. No one will ever know for sure what
might have caused the pilot to continue his flight into IMC and ultimately into the terrain.
However, it is clear that the pilot was aware of the potential to encounter poor weather
conditions prior to flight. The report also makes known that he planned to avoid adverse
weather and that he acknowledged the ground controller’s offer for help. So why would
a qualified and competent pilot fly an airworthy aircraft into the terrain?
The vast majority of weather-related accidents, up to 90%, occur when pilots
engaged in VFR flight continue to fly into adverse weather conditions. Most of these
pilots lack the experience, training, and equipment to successfully navigate through
instrument conditions. In fact, the FAA has developed VFR minimums specifically for
this reason; and yet, pilots continue to fly into the weather. There must be an explanation
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for this continuing violation of the rules, as these accidents should technically never
occur.

Causes of Weather Accidents
As researchers have explored weather accidents, a variety of explanations have
been offered to explain why a pilot might have a weather accident. Wiegmann, Talleur,
& Johnson (2008) recently identified some of the more prevalent explanations:
•

Pilots lack the knowledge and experience necessary to fly safely through or
around adverse weather (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002; O’Hare & Owen, 2002:
Wiegmann, Goh & O’Hare, 2002)

•

Pilots fail to adequately complete the pre-flight planning necessary for safe
flight (Detwiler et al., 2005; Wiggins et al., 2002; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003)

•

Pilots have limited weather evaluation skills which reduce their ability to
correctly diagnose and avoid adverse weather (Goh and Wiegmann, 2001;
Wiegmann, Goh & O’Hare, 2002; Burian et al., 2000; Wiggins & O’Hare,
2003)

•

Poor risk assessment and/or overconfidence leads a pilot to continue flight
into adverse weather that the pilot should avoid (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001;
Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995)

•

Poor in-flight planning leaves the pilot with limited options to avoid weather
(Stokes, Belger, & Zhang, 1990; Knecht, 2005)

A sixth major explanation that has been thought to lead to continued flight into
IMC is the effect of motivation and/or sunk-costs which bias the pilot into continuing
their flight (O'Hare & Owen, 2002; Wiegmann, et al., 2002). With so many contributing
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causes, a model of weather-related accident factors is needed to group and analyze these
factors. Before this model can be developed, however, an understanding of the decision
making process is needed.

Jensen’s Judgment Model
Jensen’s Judgment Model provides a helpful framework for understanding the
decision making process as it relates to weather encounters (Jensen, 1995). Jensen’s
Judgment Model, Figure 3, is a continuous closed loop model that describes the cognitive
process used to make weather-related decisions. The steps involved in the model include:
problem vigil, recognition, diagnosis, alternative identification, risk, background factor,
decision, and action. Each step represents a unique stage in the decision making process,
but in reality all stages act together to make a complete decision. The complete model is
intended to show the abilities required by the aviation judgment process.
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Problem Vigil
Recognition

Diagnosis
Alternative Identification
Risk
Background Factor
Decision
Action

Figure 3: Jensen's Judgment Model (Jensen, 1995)
The problem vigil stage is the first stage of the in the judgment model. Here the
pilot is in a state of vigilance, monitoring the environment around him. While all of the
pilot’s sensory systems should be alert as any of them could provide information about
potential problems, the pilot will primarily use his vision and hearing. The vigilance state
described here refers to much more than a passive waiting for physical stimulation.
Vigilance requires attention being focused on the information being sen
sensed.
sed. Vigilance is
therefore subject to vigilance decrement, the relatively quick loss of performance over
time. It can take considerable training and experience for pilots to become adept at
maintaining attention and focus during this stage of the judgme
judgment
nt model. Vigilance then,
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is required as an initial condition if the pilot is to move on to the second stage in the
judgment process. If the pilot is not in a state of vigilance, he will be unable to recognize
the conditions that necessitate a decision.
The second stage of the model, recognition, occurs when the pilot first realizes the
current situation could pose a threat to the safety of the flight. This ability to detect the
potential threat is dependent on several factors, including the pilot’s perceptions and
expectations. Perception is used to register and interpret the sensory information from
the environment. The perception system reduces volume of information taken in by the
senses using both simplicity and likelihood so that the information can be reasonably
processed. This is a necessary step as the senses take in much more information than
could be understood. Usually, this is quite beneficial, but the assumptions involved in
simplicity and likelihood can also lead to errors.

Expectations come from past

experiences and are thought to similarly reduce the amount of information that is needed
to make a decision (Blake & Sekular, 2006). Once a person has been exposed to a
situation, they expect future situations to result in similar outcomes. This use of previous
experience is usually quite helpful, but can also lead to errors. Through perception and
expectation a pilot identifies a potential problem.

Once the potential problem is

identified, the pilot moves to the next stage of the model.
In the diagnosis stage the pilot attempts to understand the problem that he has
recognized. Diagnosis can require information processing, knowledge, memory, and
even mathematical problem solving skills. Pilots often must consider the effects that
small system changes have on the greater system being considered. This is especially
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common in weather decisions where conditions are constantly changing, often in very
subtle ways.

There can be many different strategies used by pilots, but typically

strategies involving systematic search patterns lead to the best diagnoses. Experience is
thought to contribute to developing systematic search patterns. According to the model,
the more experience the pilot has with the conditions that have been recognized, the more
likely he will make the correct decision (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). General knowledge
of the hazards in a situation is also thought to aid in effective diagnosis. The more
knowledge a pilot has about the situation the more possible a correct diagnosis will be.
Unfortunately, however, more knowledge also leads to more complex diagnoses. At the
end of this stage the pilot has identified the problem.
The fourth stage, alternative identification, involves the generation of possible
courses of action to pursue after diagnosing the problem. There could be any number of
options generated, each with different benefits and risks. The pilot relies on his
experience, creativity, and knowledge of the aircraft and environment in this stage to
generate alternatives. Pilots of different experience levels tend to use different criteria for
generating alternatives.
Once alternatives have been identified, the pilot must determine the risks
associated with each option. In many cases several options can have similar levels of
risk, however, the more accurate the risk assessment is, the better the ultimate decision
making will likely be. The effectiveness of risk assessment is also related to the pilot’s
computational approximation skills. Once risks have been considered, the pilot moves on
to the sixth stage.
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The sixth stage in Jensen’s Judgment Model is the background factor. At this
stage, outside factors not directly associated with the decision come into play. This
involves more than just traditional mathematical bias.

It instead reflects all of the

motivational forces that exist outside of rational decision making. This would be, for
example, where the sunk-cost effect would influence the decision about to be made.
Other factors that could come into play here include: ego, social pressures, fatigue, and
anything else that would prevent purely rational decision making.
At this point the pilot has recognized the problem, generated solutions, and
analyzed those solutions. Therefore, the seventh stage is simply the decision making
stage. All of the stages leading up to this point are considered to make the decision.
Upon making a decision, the pilot progresses to the final stage of the model. In this final
stage, the action stage, the pilot simply executes the decision that has been made. Once
all stages are complete and a decision has been made, the pilot returns to the first stage to
await conditions triggering the next decision.
When all of these stages are put together into the complete framework, a clearer
picture of aeronautical decision making emerges. A chief advantage of using Jensen’s
judgment model as a framework for studying errors is that it allows errors to be classified
based on which stage of the model they occur in. Failures at any of the first six stages of
the model can lead to incorrect decisions. Central to this model is the notion that failures
at different stages lead to distinctly different types of errors. By grouping the different
types of errors, a model can be created which captures all of the types of errors which
typically lead to weather accidents.
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Model of Weather-Related Decision Errors
The types of errors which cause a pilot to continue a VFR flight in IMC can be
grouped into one of three categories: Weather Recognition, Weather Identification, and
Risk/Reward. As seen in Figure 4, these error types align with the stages of Jensen’s
Judgment Model.
Problem Vigil

Recognition
Recognition
Diagnosis

Information

Alternative
Identification

Risk

Risk/Reward
Background Factor
Decision
Action

Figure 4: Grouping of Jensen's Judgment Model by Error Type
These three error categories represent the types of failures available at each level
of the decision-making process. The six previously identified causal factors can also be
grouped into these three categories (Figure 5). Thus the model represents a complete
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view of the types of errors that lead to weather-related aviation accidents. Each error
type and the supporting research are discussed in detail below.

Recognition

Information

Risk/Reward

Experience

Pre-Flight
Planning

Motivation

Evaluation
Skills

In-flight
Planning

Risk
Assessment

Figure 5 Grouping of Causal Factors by Error Type
Risk/Reward Errors
Motivation errors occur when pilots correctly recognize the weather conditions
present but due to external circumstances continue flight into adverse conditions. These
errors occur in the later stages of the judgment model primarily at the risk and
background factor stages. Many different factors have been identified which could lead
to motivation errors including: decision framing, social pressures, risk assessment and
sunk-cost effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). The most studied of these factors is the sunkcost effect.

The sunk-cost effect refers to the irrational desire to continue with an

investment once resources have been spent to pursue that investment (O'Hare & Owen,
2002; Wiegmann et al., 2002). For example, a pilot who has nearly arrived at his
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destination airport will have a stronger desire to complete his flight compared to a pilot
who has just taken off.
The sunk-cost effect says that once someone has invested in an endeavor he is
more likely to continue with that endeavor (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). It does not matter if
the investment is time, effort, or money, once the investment has been made a person is
more likely to continue with the investment. The sunk-cost effect is most commonly
cited in economics, but has been identified in many other areas including: anthropology
(Janseen et al., 2003); medicine (Bornstein et al., 1999); and biology (Navarro & Fantino,
2005). It is, therefore, reasonable to consider whether the traditional economic sunk-cost
effect could play a role in aeronautical decision making.
In terms of economics, a sunk cost refers to a monetary cost which has already
been spent (Newnan et al., 2004). The cost is said to be “sunk” as the money has been
spent and cannot be recovered. The danger involved in sunk costs is that money that has
already been spent will adversely affect decisions made in the future. For example, a
company might be reluctant to close down a production line that is losing money making
an increasingly obsolete product if they have recently spent several million dollars
upgrading the line. The sunk-cost effect is directly opposed to rational decision theory
which states that decisions should be based on current and future potential, not past
decisions, but it is prevalent nonetheless (Thaler, 1980).
Sunk costs in economics broadly fall into one of two types. The first type of sunk
cost causes one to reject future profitable opportunities that share some similarities with
previous failed projects. The second type causes someone to stick with a bad investment
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simply because of the amount they have invested so far. In both cases previous costs
affect future decisions. It is also important to note that both types of sunk costs can exist
in the same scenario (Keasey & Moon, 2000).
The two major factors that have been identified in sunk-cost decisions are the
magnitude of costs, both initial and reinvestment costs, and the mental accounting model
used (Thames, 1996). Regarding magnitude, it has been shown that the greater the sunk
cost, the more likely people are to continue with their investment. Arkes and Blumer
(1985) completed a field study where people were charged different amounts of money
for season theater tickets. They found that the more people were charged for tickets, the
more shows they attended.

In other words, the greater their original investment

(monetary), the greater their continual reinvestment (time, effort) was. It has been shown
that in terms of reinvestment costs, the opposite is true. The greater the reinvestment
cost, the less likely the person is to reinvest (Thames, 1996).
The mental accounting model refers to the way in which the decision costs relate.
A study conducted by Thames (1996) involved a scenario in which participants had
purchased concert tickets for $20. As the day of the concert arrived participants were
told they had either lost the ticket and would have to purchase another ticket, or that they
no longer had a ride to the concert and would have to pay for a taxi to the show. The
results showed that participants were more likely pay for a taxi ride, a different mental
account than the initial cost, than they were to pay for the tickets again, the same mental
account of the initial cost.
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These results confirmed an earlier study by Arkes and Blumer (1985) in which
subjects took the role of a print shop manager considering purchasing a used, but more
efficient printing press. One group of subjects was told that the company had recently
purchased a new fleet of delivery trucks, while the other group was told the company had
just recently purchased a new printing press. Subjects in the truck group were found to
be much more likely to purchase the used printing press than subjects in the new printing
press group, despite the fact that the used press was twice as fast and twice as cost
effective as the new printing press. From these and other studies it can be concluded that
if the reinvestment cost is viewed as being in a different mental account, people are more
likely to reinvest (Thames, 1996).
The underlying cause of the sunk cost effect is thought to be related to Kahneman
and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979). One of basic principles of prospect theory states
that the way a decision is framed affects the type of decision that will likely be made. If a
decision is framed in terms of gains (a positive outcome) people tend to be more riskaverse, whereas if the decision is framed in terms of loss (negative outcome) people tend
to be risk-seeking. Sunk costs have been found to induce a loss frame which makes
people more willing to take risks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Specifically, sunk costs
tend to cause reinvestment costs to be underestimated, the potential value of reinvestment
to be overestimated, certain loss options to be avoided, and the probability of success to
be exaggerated (Thames, 1996). These effects explain how someone might make a poor
decision based on sunk-cost effects.
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The two types of sunk costs, avoiding opportunities which share similarities to
past failures and sticking with a bad investment because of the amount already invested,
could provide further insight into the role of sunk cost in aviation decision making. The
first type of sunk cost could actually play a positive role in preventing weather related
aviation accidents. This type would play out in the case of a pilot who has encountered
or attempted to fly through weather which appeared safe be turned out to be quite
treacherous.

The sunk-cost here could cause the pilot avoid even safe weather

conditions. While the pilot might make a poor choice, the pilot would at least err on the
side of safety. Conversely, if a pilot had previously diverted to avoid weather which
looked bad, but turned out to be safe, he or she might be more likely in the future to fly
into unsafe conditions under the assumption that they might improve.
The second type of sunk cost is thought to be more dangerous in weather-related
decision making (Batt & O'Hare, 2005). It takes a great deal of time and effort to fly
from one place to another. In making a cross country flight, one where you take-off from
one airport and land at another airport, a pilot might have to make arrangements to rent
an airplane, pay for the airplane and gas, arrange for transportation at the arrival airport,
etc.. The investments quickly add up. It soon becomes clear how a loss frame could be
induced by the sunk cost effect causing a pilot to push on into bad weather.
A study done by David O’Hare and Tracy Smitheram (1995) presented pilots with
a series of flight scenarios to determine how pilots tend to frame decisions and to see
whether the chosen frame affected their decision making. Pilots in this study naturally
tended to frame decisions in terms of gains and chose risk-averse behaviors. However,
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when situations were framed in terms of losses, pilots indeed displayed more risk-seeking
behaviors. While pilots in the study tended to frame their decisions in terms of gains, it
should be noted that the sunk cost effect was likely not present here. Pilots had not
invested the resources into the flight that they would have in a real life situation. In real
life situations the majority of people do place value in honoring sunk costs (Kelly, 2004).
Therefore, in a real situation the sunk-cost effect would likely cause the person to frame
the problem in terms of losses. The study also confirmed that when framed in terms of
loss the pilots were more likely to continue into poor conditions. Overall, research is
divided on the magnitude of the sunk cost effect in weather decision making (Beringer &
Ball, 2004).

Information Errors
Information errors occur when the pilot uses faulty or misleading information
about the weather conditions to make their decisions. Weather systems are dynamic,
with the capability to change quickly. This creates situations where information quickly
becomes obsolete. Further, as technology advances, pilots have access to more and more
information. This creates the potential for over-reliance on technology which, in turn,
puts pilots more at risk of information errors (Johnson et al., 2005).
A 2004 study of high-resolution weather displays showed that pilots are prone to
overly rely on their technology (Beringer & Ball).

Pilots in different experimental

conditions were given weather radars of varying resolution. The pilots who were given
higher resolution displays were much more likely to attempt to navigate through adverse
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weather conditions than were pilots with lower resolution radars. It, therefore, becomes
critical to ensure the information is as accurate as possible and to ensure pilots are well
aware of the technology’s limitations. Having the correct information is critical to the
diagnosis and alternative identification stages of Jensen’s model. These errors will likely
represent a growing portion of weather related accidents in GA.

Recognition Errors
Weather Recognition errors occur when pilots fail to correctly identify weather
conditions. These errors generally stem from a failure in one of the early stages of the
Jensen’s Judgment Model, namely the problem vigil or recognition state. When this type
of error occurs, pilots are unaware that the conditions have degraded beyond VFR
minimums. A failure at the weather recognition stage causes the pilot to inadvertently
continue their flight into adverse weather.
There are many sources of information pilots can utilize to plan their trips;
however, once airborne the list of options narrows. While pilots sometimes have access
to NEXRAD weather information, this information can be delayed and/or misleading.
Ultimately, the pilot alone must analyze the weather conditions and choose an
appropriate response. Often, a pilot’s primary option for gathering the information to
make his decision is the view out of the cockpit window. It is, therefore, not surprising
that errors occurring during weather identification lead to poor weather related decisions,
which, in turn, lead to accidents and fatalities.
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Weather Recognition errors are best described by the Situation Assessment
Hypothesis. The Situation Assessment Hypothesis explains that pilots continue into
adverse weather because they fail to observe that conditions have deteriorated beyond
VFR minimums (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). There is strong evidence from both accident
data (NTSB, 2005; Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare 2002) and simulator studies (Goh &
Wiegmann 2001) that suggests the Situational Assessment Hypothesis holds true.
A 2002 simulator study sought to investigate the role of sunk costs in decision
making by exposing pilots to adverse weather either early or late in their flight
(Wiegmann et al.). The results found that pilots who encountered weather earlier in their
flights were more likely to continue into IMC than pilots who encountered weather later
in the flight. This is in contrast with the sunk-cost effect which would predict that the
more time a pilot had invested in a flight, the more likely he would be to continue and
finish the flight. Instead, the findings support the Situation Assessment Hypothesis by
suggesting that pilots who encountered weather sooner in the flight were less able to
distinguish the degradation of conditions than pilots who encountered weather later in
their flight.
The Situation Assessment Hypothesis is further supported by a 2001 simulator
study that found a strong correlation between poor estimates of weather conditions and
the decision to continue flight (Goh & Wiegmann). The pilots who continued flight into
IMC had significantly higher estimates of visibility than pilots who diverted.

This

suggests that the most important way to keep pilots from flying into adverse conditions is
to thoroughly train them to identify weather conditions accurately.
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VFR Into IMC Accident Studies
The potential for safety advances to reduce accident rates and save lives has led
many to investigate the VFR into IMC problem. The work that has been done can
primarily be divided into two categories: historical data studies and experimental task
studies. Both types of studies provide unique and necessary insight to the problem.
Batt and O’Hare completed an extensive study on the behavior of pilots when
they encountered adverse weather (2005). The study examined 491 accidents from the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau database of aviation occurrences. The study divided
the cases into one of three groups based on their actions upon encountering adverse
weather: VFR into IMC, precautionary landing, or other significant weather avoidance
action. Demographic comparisons, including age, gender, total flight hours, etc., showed
few differences between the three groups. The relative distance flown into the weather,
however, showed a clear difference between groups. Pilots in the weather avoidance
action group acted much sooner than pilots in other groups. Additionally, the analysis
showed the midpoint of flight to be the psychological turning point of the flight
regardless of the total flight distance. The results of the study indicate that a safe pilot is
one who proactively responds to the weather conditions. Therefore, the sooner a pilot
can recognize weather conditions, the better he will be able to respond appropriately.
Another large investigation of accident data was completed in 2002 (Goh &
Wiegmann). The study reviewed all VFR into IMC accidents that occurred in the United
States between 1990 and 1997. The VFR into IMC accidents were compared to an
analogous group of other GA accidents occurring during this time period. The results of
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this comparison found pilots involved in VFR into IMC accidents had significantly less
experience (flight hours) than pilots in the control group. Pilots in weather accidents
were also found to be more likely to be carrying passengers. A further investigation of
VFR into IMC accidents showed that the majority of the flights involved intentional
flight into adverse weather. Thus, the research suggests that the underlying causes of
these accidents involve: situation assessment, risk perception, and social pressure.
Therefore, intervention programs should address all three of these factors.
A study of weather accidents in New Zealand between 1988 and 2000 found
results consistent with previous research (O'Hare & Owen 2002). The study initially
examined 1,308 accidents where weather was a causal factor. Comparisons were made
between accidents caused by external failures and accidents caused by internal failures
(i.e. failures of the pilot). The study found significant differences regarding visibility,
altitude, and crash severity between the two groups. The study then examined in detail
77 weather accidents that occurred during cross-country VFR flights. These accidents
were found to occur farther along in the flight than non-weather related accidents. The
weather accidents were further found to involve younger, less experienced pilots. The
most significant difference between groups was the pilots’ ages at initial flight
certification. This study supports the notion that experience and sunk costs play a role in
weather accidents. It further showed that other demographic factors beyond total flight
hours can play an important role in weather accidents.
Another relevant study conducted by Conway et al. focused specifically on
accidents occurring in Alaska between 1990 and 2002 (2005). Alaska has a dangerous
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combination of extreme weather conditions and a high demand for flights. Between 1990
and 2002 there were 491 fatalities resulting from commuter and air taxi crashes. For this
study, Conway, et al. divided all Alaskan commuter and air taxi companies into one of
two groups based on their historical accident rates; a high-risk group and a low-risk
group.

They then used survey results from the companies in each group to find the

significant differences in company practices and culture. The high-risk group was found
to use less experience pilots and to have them work more frequently.

High-risk

companies were more likely to put time pressure on pilots to make flights and to have
pilots flying who were fatigued. One of the most drastic differences between the groups
was found in regard to weather briefings. High-risk companies were three times as likely
to send pilots out into unknown weather conditions. This supports the role of both
Weather Recognition and Weather Information in causing accidents.
Several experiment-based studies have further provided insight into the VFR into
IMC problem. Goh and Wiegmann (2001) used a high-fidelity flight simulator to study
the magnitude of the effects of cognitive and motivational factors on a pilot’s decision to
continue flight into adverse weather. The study involved thirty-two non-instrument pilots
flying a simulated a one hour cross-country flight. Forty-five minutes into their flight,
the pilots encountered adverse weather. Twenty-two of the thirty-two pilots continued
their flight into the adverse weather.

This confirmed the study’s hypothesis that the

pilots would be likely to continue flight into adverse weather. Several distinctions were
found between pilots who continued into adverse weather and pilots who diverted. Pilots
who continued into adverse weather rated themselves higher in terms of skill and
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judgment than those who diverted. They also rated themselves as less likely to take risks.
The group who continued rated the weather as less hazardous than those who did not
continue. That suggests that the group who continued flight did a worse job evaluating
the conditions present. Experience was not found to be a significant factor in continued
flight, though all pilots in the study were relatively inexperienced (median flight hours =
60). Of all factors, accuracy of visibility estimates was the most important predictor of
flight into adverse weather. These findings suggest over-confidence and poor weather
recognition lead to continued flight into adverse weather.
Knecht et al. sought to investigate the effects of visibility, cloud ceiling height,
financial incentive, and personality on one’s willingness to takeoff into adverse weather
(2005).

The study involved 60 GA pilot participants completing a task in a flight

simulator. Pilots were placed in the simulator and asked to complete a flight between two
locations. The weather conditions present during takeoff were varied for each pilot.
Pilots were also placed into groups in which some received a standard rate of pay for
participation, while others received incentivized pay based on their ability to complete
the flight. The interaction of visibility, cloud ceiling, and financial incentive were then
compared based on how they affected the pilot’s decision to takeoff on the flight. The
results showed weather decisions to be complicated. Many models and factors were
considered to determine which could best predict a pilot’s willingness to takeoff in
adverse weather. The combined effect of cloud ceiling and visibility was found to best
predicted takeoff. Financial incentive was also found to influence takeoff. In the low
incentive group, pilots used cloud ceiling and visibility as primary factors, while pilots in
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the high incentive group used mainly the incentive to decide if they should take off.
None of the personality tests could predict takeoff. Experience also failed to predict
takeoff. These results seem to show that pilots do not seem to have an inherent bias
towards taking extreme risks.
Building on their previous study, Wiegmann and Goh (2002) sought to investigate
the effects of situation assessment and experience on a pilot’s decision to continue flight
into adverse weather. In this study 36 pilots flew a simulated cross country flight in
which they encountered adverse weather either early or late in the flight. In addition to
tracking which pilots flew into adverse weather, this study also tracked the distance flown
into the weather.

It was thought that sunk-cost effects would cause pilots who

encountered weather later in their flights to be more likely to continue through the
weather to complete their flight. The results, however, found the opposite to be the case.
Pilots encountering weather early in their flight flew further into adverse weather.
Interestingly, pilots in the early group also rated the weather conditions as being less
severe than pilots in the later group. This suggests poor situational assessment to be a
stronger factor in VFR into IMC accidents than the effects of sunk-costs. The study also
showed both the time and the distance flown into weather were inversely related to the
pilot’s experience. These results suggest that the focus of research and interventions to
prevent VFR into IMC accidents should be on improving situational assessment,
especially among inexperienced pilots.
A study specifically focusing on the way pilots frame and make decisions was
conducted by O’Hare and Smitheram in 1995. Using Prospect Theory as a base for
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understanding the problem, O’Hare and Smitheram set out to determine how pilots
framed the decision to continue flight when encountering adverse weather and to
determine the effect of the decision frame on the final decision. The study involved 24
pilots from New Zealand who were each given two computer based flight scenarios and
asked to make a timely decision about continuing their flight. Pilots were also asked to
rate the importance of eight statements regarding weather-related decision making and
were asked what type of decision frame (gains or losses) they naturally used to make
weather decisions. No demographic information was able to predict the type of decision
frame that was chosen. The frame chosen was also unable to predict the pilot’s decision
to continue. Participants rated the possibility of damaging the aircraft and possibility of
not being able to handle the conditions as the most important factors in making a
decision. Social pressure was rated as being the least important factor in the pilot’s
decisions. When the decision frame was manipulated, a direct effect was seen in the
pilot’s choices: pilots in the loss frame continued flight, pilots in the gains frame diverted.
The results suggest pilots naturally use a more complicated decision frame than a simple
gains or losses frame. The results also imply that pilots should be taught to make their
weather decision based only on their current situation.
A 1995 study was completed to investigate the information acquisition strategies
used by pilots when making weather decisions (Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). The study
consisted of six computerized weather scenarios. Each scenario had detailed information
regarding all aspects of the flight spread out over multiple pages in the computer
program. The computer then tracked which information each subject accessed. The
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results found that novice pilots examined more information, spent more time examining
information, and had a higher rate of information recursion. The results also indicated
that novice pilots were more likely to return home, while expert pilots were more likely
to continue their flight. The study suggests that expert pilots have developed specific
strategies for gathering information and making decisions. It also suggests that teaching
weather decision making could be a difficult task that pilots learn very gradually over
time.
A 2006 study by Wiggins and Bollwerk investigated the information acquisition
strategies used by pilots to make weather-related decisions. In this study pilots were
taught decision making heuristics based on three different strategies: frequency,
elimination by aspects, and majority of confirming decisions. Pilots were then asked to
choose and apply one of the strategies to a computer-based weather scenario. The results
found that pilots preferred to use the elimination by aspects heuristic. However, the
choice of the optimal decision response was predicted by task experience rather than
decision making strategy.
Wiggins and O’Hare further investigated the role of experience and motivation in
the decision to continue flight into adverse weather (2003). They found that VFR into
IMC interventions could generally be divided into one of two approaches: motivational or
experimental. Motivational assumes pilots have different levels of susceptibility to the
pressure which might lead a pilot to continue flight into adverse weather. This approach
assumes that experienced pilots learn to control these pressures and make better
decisions.

It is unclear whether differences in experience are due to information
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acquisition strategies or actual scene perception. Generally experts and novices can be
distinguished by the ability to quickly differentiate and diagnosis a problem. The purpose
of their study was to examine the differences in the use of cues by novice and expert
pilots. The study used an online survey of 577 pilots from around the world. A set of ten
images were quasi-randomly selected from a pool of 150 images and presented to the
pilots. Pilots were asked to rate the importance of a series of weather cues in each image.
High-time pilots placed a higher value on each cue than low-time pilots. Also, the
research found that high-time pilots used slightly more cues than low-time pilots. Hightime pilots were found to value cloud base and horizontal visibility more than low-time
pilots while low-time pilots valued wind strength more. Subjects who decided to continue
flight valued cloud base and cloud type more than pilots who diverted. Pilots who
diverted tended to value cloud concentration more than those who continued.
A 1997 study was designed to understand the way pilots use information in
weather-related decision making (Driskill). Specifically, the study focused on
understanding the mental models pilots use to weigh information and make decisions.
Two types of decision-making models have been suggested to represent how pilots make
decisions: compensatory models and non-compensatory models.

When using a

compensatory decision model the various factors of a decision work together allowing
positive factors to compensate for negative factors in a decision. For example, a pilot
might think it is safe to continue flight when the cloud ceiling is low if visibility is quite
high. When using a non-compensatory model, each factor is viewed independently. In
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the previous example, a pilot would divert if the cloud ceiling was low regardless of the
visibility.
To test which model pilots use, pilots were give a series of 27 written weather
scenarios. Pilots were asked to arrange them from safest to least safe. Pilots then
assigned a comfort rating from 0 to 100 for each scenario. The results showed that pilots
used compensatory decision-making models when analyzing the scenarios. What’s more,
pilots were also found to be quite consistent in their ordering of scenarios. There was,
however, a large degree of variability in the comfort ratings assigned to each scenario.
On the whole, pilots used compensatory decision-making models to consistently rank
weather scenarios, regardless of flight experience.
Using the results of the previous study, Driskill et al. completed a follow-up study
analyzing pilots’ responses to various scenarios (1998). In this follow-up study, pilots
were given a series of 51 written scenarios in order to address their weather-related
decision-making skills. For each scenario, they were given four alternatives and asked
which alternative would be the most appropriate for the given scenario. The pilots’
selections were then compared with a panel of expert pilots’ decisions. There were 246
pilots (mean of 500 total flight hours) that completed the study. In general, the pilots’
selection of alternatives agreed with the experts’ choices, however, there was a fair
amount of variability within the individual pilot’s ratings. The findings seemed to show
little relationship between decision making skills and flight experience (or any other
demographic variables).
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Hunter et al. completed a similar study in 2003 to compare pilots’ decisionmaking models and to assign worth functions to weather-related decision making. As in
Driskill’s studies, a variety of written scenarios were given to pilots. Pilots were asked to
rate the importance of the different factors involved in their decisions. The study used a
larger sample size of 481 subjects and included pilots from Norway and Australia. The
results were quite similar to the Driskill studies, finding that pilots consistently use
compensatory decision making models to make weather-related decisions. Hunter was
able to develop a regression model that could predict pilots’ decisions to given scenarios.
Research also suggests that pilots, on the whole, have trouble estimating weather
conditions (Coyne et al. 2008). A study was completed involving twenty four pilots, half
instrument rated and half non-instrument rated, with relatively similar flight experience
levels. Subjects were shown five-second looping videos of weather conditions that were
generated in Microsoft flight simulator 2004. Pilots estimated visibility and cloud ceiling
for each of the video clips. The results indicated that pilots had trouble estimating
weather conditions; they tended to overestimate conditions in the videos. This further
supports the Situation Assessment Hypothesis. Non-instrument rated pilots were better
able to estimate visibility, while no difference was found between rating groups for
estimating cloud ceiling. Having an IFR license did not improve weather assessment in
this experiment. The results also supported the use of a compensatory decision-making
model among pilots as cloud ceiling estimates affected visibility estimates and vice versa.
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Experience and Weather Related Decision Making
In both accident investigation studies and simulator studies, flight experience is
consistently cited as a primary factor in weather-related accidents. A comprehensive
study of all VFR into IMC accidents in the U.S. between 1990 and 1997 showed pilots
involved in VFR into IMC accidents have significantly less experience compared with a
representative cross-section of other GA accidents. A study of VFR into IMC accidents
in New Zealand also showed experience to be a key factor (2002). A study of 491 fatal
accidents in Alaska from 1990-2002 compared safety records of commercial flight
operations and found that companies with higher accident rates used pilots with less
flight experience (Conway et al., 2005).
Experimental studies involving simulated flight have similarly shown flight
experience to affect weather-related decision making. A study by Wiegmann et al. put
pilots in a flight simulator on a cross-country VFR flight that encountered adverse
weather (2002). The results showed that flight experience was negatively correlated to
both the distance and time pilots flew into adverse weather conditions.
Other studies have focused on analyzing how experience affects a pilot’s decision
making process.

A recent study by Wiggins and Bollwerk compared different

information acquisition strategies to determine how they affect decision making among
pilots (2006). Several strategies were taught and tested, but in the end, task-related
experience proved to be more important in decision making than acquisition strategy.
Another study presented subjects with a series of computer based weather scenarios while
tracking the information subjects used in the program (Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003). Their
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results showed that high-flight time pilots were able to make correct decisions quicker,
using less information, and with a lower rate of information recursion. A 2003 study
drew similar conclusions through the use of an online survey of 577 pilots (Goh &
Wiegmann, 2001). Experienced pilots were found to require fewer cues to make weather
decisions.
Several conclusions can thus be drawn regarding the role of experience in weather
related decision making. Primarily, it can be seen that task-related experience affects the
decision making process.

High-time pilots make decisions more quickly, more

accurately and with less information than low-time pilots. Pilots with less experience
have been shown to fly further into adverse weather and to be more likely to be involved
in weather related accidents. Therefore, a better understanding of how high-time pilots
make weather-related decisions could pave the way for better training strategies.

Signal Detection Theory
One particularly applicable method for measuring and analyzing decision making
is Signal Detection Theory (SDT). With origins in electrical engineering, SDT defines
and explains performance in systems with two discrete states which are not easily
discriminated between due to noise (Blake & Sekular, 2006). SDT has been applied in
many areas since its inception including: pharmaceuticals (Merlo-Pich & Gomeni, 2008),
human memory studies (Banks, 1970), linguistics (Iverson & Kuhl 1995), weather
forecasting (Harvey et al., 1992), and many others.
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Signal Detection Theory postulates that in these types of systems there are two
primary distributions present. When there is no signal present, there is a distribution
which represents the inherent noise in the system. This noise can be generated either
externally, from the environment, or internally, within the person (Sanders &
McCormick, 1993). When there is no signal present the person can either respond “no”
there is no signal present or “yes” there is a signal present. The “no” response in this
case represents a correct rejection as the person has correctly identified that there is no
signal present. A “yes” response represents a false alarm as the person has said there is a
signal present when there was in fact no signal present.
When the signal is present the system is described by the distribution of noise
plus the signal. In this case the noise can potentially mask the presence of the signal. If
the person responds that there is no signal when the signal is present, their decision is
characterized as a miss. If the person identifies that the signal is present, the decision is
considered a hit. Thus, the four types of responses to a signal detection task are hit, miss,
false alarm, and correct rejection. Of these, hit and correct rejection are considered
correct decisions, while miss and false alarm are considered incorrect decisions. A
graphical representation of signal detection theory can be seen in Figure 6.
There are two primary concepts of Signal Detection Theory which make it
particularly useful, response criterion and sensitivity. Sensitivity, sometimes referred as
discriminability, serves as a measurement of how well a person can distinguish between
the signal and no-signal conditions. This can be represented visually as the distance
between the noise distribution and the signal plus noise distribution. In a task with high
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sensitivity, the noise and signal plus noise distributions are spread out leaving only a
small portion of overlap. In this case subjects would be expected to have a higher rate of
decision making accuracy. In a less sensitive system, the distributions would be much
closer together, reducing the probability of a correct decision.

Sensitivity is most

commonly measured with d’ when the data is normally distributed and A’ with nonparametric data. In most systems d’ values typically range from .5 to 2.
Response bias, or criterion, represents the decision point at which the person says
they detect the signal. Importantly, this value acts independently of the sensitivity of the
system. The level at which a person’s response bias is set will have a large impact on
which of the four outcomes result from their decision. SDT suggests two major factors
which influence the placement of the response bias: the likelihood of observing the signal
and the costs and benefits related to the four potential outcomes (Sanders & McCormick,
1993). In a quality-control task where the likelihood of a signal (a defective part) is quite
low, a person is likely to set a very liberal bias. The person doesn’t expect to see a signal,
so they are more likely to say there was no signal if they are not sure, resulting in a miss.
A person involved in a missile detection task, however, would set a very conservative
bias due to the high costs associated with not detecting a missile. This would results in a
higher number of false alarms, but a lower number of misses.
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Figure 6: Graphical Representation of Signal Detection Theory
Signal Detection Theory can, therefore, provide a good framework for
understanding and analyzing weather-related decision making.
considered the presence of adverse weather.

The signal can be

The response would be the pilot’s

recognition of adverse weather, resulting in choosing to change flight path. Thus, a hit
would entail recognizing adverse weather when it was present and choosing to change
flight paths to avoid the weather. A complete list of outcomes is available in

Table 2. Sensitivity would correspond to the overall accuracy of weather-related
decision making. The response bias would affect how likely pilots are to continue into
weather conditions they were unsure of.
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Table 2: Signal Detection Theory States for Weather Decision Making

Eye Tracking Benefits and Capabilities
One technology which could potentially shed much light onto the weather related
decision-making process is eye tracking. To a large degree humans rely on their visual
systems to gather information about the world around them. The anatomy of the human
eye creates an opportunity to track the specific information a person is taking in at any
given time. Of the eye’s two main sensors, rods and cones, only the cones provide sharp,
detailed visual information to the brain. Around 95% of the eye’s cones are tightly
packed in the center of the retina in an area known as the fovea (Blake & Sekular, 2006).
The tight packing of cones results in only a small portion of a person’s visual field
providing detailed information to the brain. Therefore, when gathering information about
a scene, a person’s visual scanpath consists of a series of fixations spread around the
scene. With each fixation the brain gathers another piece of information which it uses to
make sense of the scene. Interestingly, people’s fixation patterns are directly linked to
task they are performing (Starker, 1990). People use dynamic mental models to evaluate
which parts of the visual scene are relevant and fixate on those parts (Hayhoe, 2003).
By tracking and studying the patterns of fixations a person makes when viewing a scene,
the parts of the scene they deem relevant can be observed.
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Many fields such as

marketing (Pieters, Rosbergen, & Wedel, 1999), driving (Underwood et al., 2003),
reading (Libben & Titone, 2009), usability (Cooke, 2005), aviation (Wetzel &
Armstrong, 1997), and computer science (Toet 2006) have all benefitted from eye
tracking research.
Eye tracking is well suited to capturing differences and insights into the way
people gather visual information to make decisions. A 2004 study by Law et al.
specifically addressed the difference in gaze patterns between novices and experts in a
laproscopic surgery task. Laproscopic surgery requires the surgeon to rely on a large
degree to visual information, making this a comparable task to in-flight weather decision
making. The study compared five expert and five novice surgeons’ scanpaths to look for
differences that could be addressed by training. The study used traditional eye tracking
metrics such as total gaze time and fixation count to compare experts and novices in a
surgery task. The data show that novices required more visual feedback than experts.
Novices also directed a larger portion of their gaze time on the surgical tool itself, where
as experts directed more of their gaze towards the target. These findings suggest that
training should focus on making surgeons more comfortable with the actual surgical tools
so that they can focus their attention on the target instead of the tool.
A study by Lavine, Sibert, Gokturk, and Dickens sought to investigate the
relationship between eye movements and effectiveness during vigilance tasks (2002).
Subjects watched an array of numbers for 30 minutes and pressed a button when a certain
combination of numbers appeared. The results showed that scanpaths could predict hits
and misses by the subjects. Scanpaths that remained focused on the relevant numbers
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resulted in an increased number of hits. This confirms that the insights available from
studying scanpaths would be a valuable metric for measuring the improvements resulting
from training.
Eye tracking has also been used as an active form of input in computer systems.
A 2005 study by Qvarfodt and Zhai developed and tested a virtual map system that used
eye tracking input to supplement the users’ navigation of the map. When the program
noticed a user’s gaze fixating on a certain area of the map, the program displayed more
information about that area. The subjects in the study positively rated their experience
using the interactive program. Of particular interest, however, was that often, subjects
reported being unaware of the focus of their gaze and being surprised by the program’s
ability to provide them with information they didn’t realize they were looking for. The
subjects were unconsciously gathering information to make decisions. This indicates that
eye tracking can potentially provide more detailed information than traditional self-report
methodologies as people can be unaware of the information they are considering.

Purpose
The research has thus established that pilot’s continued flight into adverse
weather is a significant problem that warrants further research. More specifically, there
is a notable lack of research regarding the way pilots gather weather information. It has
been suggested that both experience and training affect the way pilots gather information
and the type of information they gather. This study will, therefore, aim to address this
problem. Pilots will be presented with a series of weather scenes on an eye-tracking
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computer monitor. As they review each scene and decide if the conditions pictured meet
VFR minimums, the computer will track their eye movements. Since eye movements are
tightly linked to cognitive processes (Toet, 2006), the pilots’ scanpaths will provide novel
insight into their weather-related decision making process. The effects of both training
and experience will be analyzed to see how they affect the decision making process.
In the end, it is hoped that the insights gained from this study will provide a
foundation for understanding how pilots make weather related decisions. From this
foundation, more effective training programs could be developed. This study will also
demonstrate a method for objectively analyzing the effectiveness of training programs.
Eye tracking data will show whether or not the training program actually changes the
subject’s behavior. From analysis of the training program, suggested improvements will
be discussed. Ultimately, the goal of this study is to learn how to better train pilots to
make accurate weather-related decisions.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Participants
This study involved 60 participants recruited from Clemson University in
Clemson, SC and the surrounding areas. The participants were divided into three equal
groups of 20 based on the total number of flight hours each participant had accumulated.
The first group consisted of non-pilots who had no prior flight training or experience.
The second group consisted of low-time pilots who had accumulated less than 500 total
flight hours. The third group included high-time pilots who had accumulated over 500
total flight hours.
Non-pilot subjects were recruited through word of mouth advertising around the
Clemson University campus. Of the 20 non-pilot subjects there were nine male and
eleven female subjects. The participants were an average age of 25.5 years old with a
standard deviation of 4.8 years. The maximum age was 42 and the minimum age was 21.
None of the non-pilot subjects had accumulated any flight hours or certifications.
The low-time and high-time pilots were recruited through the Clemson University
Flight Club and from flyers at local airports, as well as through word of mouth
advertising. A copy of the flyer used is available in Appendix B. The low-time flight
group consisted of 17 male and 3 female subjects. Low-time pilots were an average age
of 33.58 years old with a standard deviation of 13.3 years. The maximum age was 53 and
the minimum age was 19. The high-time pilot group consisted of 19 male and 1 female
subjects.

The average age of high-time pilots was 53.4 years old with a standard
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deviation of 12.59 years. The maximum age was 75 and the minimum age was 23. A
detailed breakdown of mean flight experience can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3: Pilot Demographic Information
Age at
Certification
Low-time Pilots
28.4
(St. Dev.)
11.6
High-time Pilots
27.2
(St. Dev.)
13.2

Total Flight
Hours
203.6
154.0
4116.8
3896.3

Instrument Flight Hours
Flight Hours Last 6 Months
33.4
25.2
44.1
25.8
756.5
140.4
1221.3
194.0

All subjects in the study reported having normal or corrected to normal vision.
All subjects also reported having never used the WeatherWise training program.

Apparatus and Materials
Eye Tracking
All data collection for this study was done in the Eye Tracking Laboratory in
McAdams Hall on the campus of Clemson University. A Tobii ET-1750 eye tracking
monitor was used to collect all eye tracking data. The ET-1750 provides non-invasive
eye tracking on a 17” monitor. The ET-1750 is able to take samples at a rate of 50 hz
with 0.5º accuracy. For this study the resolution of the monitor was set at 1280 x 1024
pixels. The eye tracking monitor can be seen below in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Tobii 1750 Eye Tracking Monitor (Left)
The eye tracking monitor was powered by a Sun W2100z pc with a 2.0 GHz
AMD Opteron 246 processor and 2 GB of RAM. All eye tracking data was collected
using the software program ClearView 2.7.0 developed by Tobii Technology. A second
computer setup was used to allow participants to manually identify weather features. The
setup consisted of a Dell Inspiron 640m laptop computer powering a 17” Dell monitor.
The computer has a 1.73GHz dual-core processor with 2 GB of RAM. The resolution of
the monitor was set at 1280 x 1024 pixels. The computer and monitor from the first task
was also used to run the training program WeatherWise.
Training Program
A computer-based training program called WeatherWise was used to teach
weather-related decision making in this study. It was developed by Dr. David Hunter,
Dr. Mark Wiggins, and Dr. David O’Hare. The program was produced by the Federal
Aviation Administration and Office of Aerospace Medicine for the Aviation Safety
Program of the Flight Standards Service; with the assistance of The Ohio State
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University, The University of Western Sydney, The University of Otago, and King
Schools. The program is available free in the public domain.
WeatherWise is composed of three main sections: weather to fly, decide to fly,
and take a flight.

The first section begins with an introduction to weather-related

decision making. As a part of the introduction the user is asked to rate the weather
conditions in a series of images as either above or below VFR minimums.

Once

complete, the program tells the user the number of correctly identified images.
Weatherwise then provides a list of visual cues that pilots should use to make weather
decisions. The cues which are shown are: cloud base, visibility, cloud coloring, cloud
density, terrain clearance, rain showers, cloud type, horizon, and wind. For each cue,
with the exception of wind, the program provides a brief description, a sample image, and
a small video clip of the feature. An image of this exercise is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: WeatherWise Training Program
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The next part of the Weather to Fly section consists of identifying which features
are present in a weather image. Users check the features present in an image and decide
if they would continue their VFR flight. Users are encouraged to divert from the flight if
three or more features are present.

Once their answers are submitted the program

provides feedback as to the actual features present and the correct decision.
Users then participate in a mock flight example. They are given an initial briefing
and shown video clip from various phases of the flight. Users are asked at which stage of
the flight conditions have deteriorated enough to mandate a diversion in flight path.
Once a stage has been identified, users are then given feedback on their choice. Users are
then reminded once more that when three or more cues are present, they should divert
from their scheduled flight path. This completes the “Weather to Fly” section.
The second section of the training module, “Decide to Fly”, begins with an
accident investigation study. The subject is provided with information on the flight
history, a sectional chart, meteorological information, wreckage information, pilot
information, and a flight transcript. Based on the information subjects are then asked to
identify the primary cause of the accident.
Next, users are presented with a series of questions to ask themselves after
deciding to divert from their flight path. These questions are targeted at distance to
alternate airport, weather conditions, facilities, and terrain.

Users then complete an

exercise involving identifying alternate airports. They are given complete flight
information, as well as information on available options. They then must choose the best
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alternative. Once a choice has been made, users are given feedback regarding their
response. That completes the “Decide to Fly” section.
The final section of the training program involves complete weather-related
decision making practice. To begin, users are given complete flight scenario briefings.
They are then shown a series of video clips representing different positions along the
flight path. For each clip users must decide to either continue flight or to divert. When a
diversion is chosen, pilots must further choose which airport to divert their flight to.
Upon completing this section, users are given a brief summary of the training and then
are finished with the training program.
Weather Images
In preparation for this study a group of 120 images were gathered. The pictures
were gathered from various photo websites including the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Photo Library, Flickr®, and stock.xchng®.

All images

collected were either royalty free images or images released under the creative commons
license.

The pictures collected showed various weather conditions ranging from

relatively clear skies to severe thunderstorms. All images represented a weather scene a
pilot might see from their cockpit window on a cross country flight. From the original
120 images, the 36 images which best represented the various weather conditions were
chosen. These images were then sent out for external validation by a group of expert
pilots. The group consisted of 5 pilots with an average of 5,760 flight hours. The pilots
rated the conditions of each image as either VFR conditions or IFR conditions. From
their ratings, the 10 pictures which best represented each type of weather condition were
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chosen. These 20 images were then divided into two equal groups, group A and group
B, each with five pictures of VFR conditions and five pictures of IFR conditions. Two
sample images are shown in Figure 9. All of the images can be seen in Appendix C.

Figure 9: Sample Weather Image Depicting VFR Conditions (left) and IFR Conditions
(right)
Demographic Questionnaire
A demographic questionnaire was created to gather pertinent information about
each subject in the study. The survey consists of questions targeted at basic demographic
information and questions targeted at flight experience. Information collected by the
survey included the subjects’ age, gender, total flight hours, instrument flight hours,
recent flight hours, flight certifications held, and weather training experience.

This

information was gathered for data verification and analysis. All personal identifying
information that was collected in the questionnaire was kept confidential. A copy of the
questionnaire is available in Appendix D.
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Weather Feature Identification
A Microsoft Access database was used to collect the data for this task. A custom
form was created to allow users to identify the areas in each image they used to make
their decisions. The program presents a weather scene and asks the participant to use the
computer mouse to click on and describe each feature in the image that is significant to
deciding if they could continue along their current flight path. The database records the
X and Y coordinates of each click along with the brief description of the feature provided
by the participant. An image of the program is seen in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Weather Feature Identification Program
Procedures
Participants were first given an initial briefing about the nature and goals of this
study. They then read and signed an informed consent form. By signing this form
participants both acknowledged potential risks of the study and agreed to participate in
the study. A copy of the informed consent form is available in Appendix E. After
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signing the informed consent form, each subject completed the demographic
questionnaire.
Participants were then given an introduction to general aviation and weather
decision making.

The introduction was read from a script to ensure consistency.

Participants were told they would be taking on the role of general aviation pilot that is
certified only for visual flight rules flight. They were then given a description of visual
flight rules including the specific requirements for daytime flight in class G airspace.
Participants were then told to assume they were on a cross-country VFR daytime flight in
class G airspace. Participants were told that they would be shown a series of pictures
representing weather conditions encountered along their flight.

For each picture

participants were told to verbally respond to the question “could you continue along your
current flight path while staying above VFR minimums?” A “yes” response signified
that the conditions pictured could be flown into while staying above VFR minimums,
while a “no” response signified that VFR flight could not be maintained along the current
flight path. A “no” response also signified that pilots would choose to divert from their
current flight path. Participants were then asked if they had any questions or needed any
clarification about the task. The script used for the study is available in Appendix D.
Once the introduction was read, the first image task was begun.

The first

experimental task consisted of showing participants a series of 10 weather images and
asking if the conditions pictured allowed for continued VFR flight. Before beginning the
task, subjects were assigned to either view group A or group B images. Subjects were
first calibrated to the eye-tracking monitor through fixating on a blue circle as it moved
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through a series of nine places on the screen. Upon successful calibration, subjects were
shown a practice image to ensure that the task and required response was understood.
After successfully completing the practice attempt the subjects were ready begin the task
with actual test images.
Before each image was shown, the eye tracker was checked to ensure it was
recognizing both of the subject’s eyes. The image was then shown on the monitor for as
much time as was needed for the subject to make a decision. Once the subject responded
“yes” or “no” the eye tracking was stopped and their answer was recorded. This process
was continued for each of the 10 images in the subject’s image group. The display order
of the images for each subject was randomly generated ahead of time.

Subjects were

allowed to take a break before beginning the next portion of the study.
Subjects next proceeded to the second computer station to identify the weather
features they used to make their decisions. Subjects used a custom Microsoft Access
database to identify, or tag, each feature in the image that was important to the decision
made in the first task. Subjects tagged important features by pointing the mouse cursor at
the feature and clicking the mouse button. This placed a box around the click location
and brought up a textbox in which the subject described the weather feature that they had
tagged. Subjects were presented with all 10 images used in the first part of the task.
Subjects were encouraged to tag as many features in each weather scene as they thought
were relevant to the decision making process. Upon completing the image tagging,
subjects were allowed to take a break before starting the training program.
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Subjects were then moved back to their original computer workstation to
complete the weather-related decision making program WeatherWise. Subjects were told
to take as much time as needed to fully complete the training program. Subjects were
given over-the-ear headphones to use during the training to minimize any external
distractions. Upon completing the program, subjects continued on to another image
viewing task.
The final portion of the study involved subjects viewing another series of images
on the eye tracker. Subjects were given the same briefing and information as in the first
task. Subjects then viewed a series of 20 weather images. The first ten images were new
images that the subjects had not previously seen. The next ten images were the original
ten images the subjects had seen in the first task. The order that the images were
displayed was randomly generated for each subject. For each image subjects were asked
if the conditions pictured allowed for continued flight while remaining above VFR
minimums. Subjects again verbally responded either “yes”, that VFR minimums were
met, or “no”, VFR minimums were not met. When the subject finished the 20th image,
the task was complete. Subjects were then thanked for their time, compensated and
dismissed.

Data
The data collected in this experiment was primarily collected to analyze the
effects experience and training have on weather related decision making.

Several

different types of data were collected in order to gain a holistic understanding of the
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decision making process and its effectiveness. The data collected in this experiment can
be generally broken down into three separate categories: weather decision data, eye
tracking data, and weather feature identification data. All data was analyzed across the
two main experiment factors: training and experience.

Weather Decision Data
The first set of data to be collected and analyzed in this experiment is the verbal
responses to each weather scenario. The responses first were determined to be either
correct or incorrect by comparing the subjects’ responses to the expert panel’s assessment
of each image. This provided an accuracy rating for each group and condition.
Signal detection theory (SDT) will then used to code each response into one of
four categories: hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection. The assignment of each
response to a SDT category will be determined based on the subject’s assessment of the
conditions and the actual conditions picture (as determined by the panel of expert pilots).
For example, if IMC is present and the subject responds “no” (signifying the conditions
pictured are below VFR minimums), this would be coded as a hit. If the subject responds
“yes” (signifying the conditions are above VFR minimums and they could continue)
when IMC is present, this would be coded as a miss. The complete breakdown of SDT
category assignment can be seen above in Table 2.
The resulting data then allowed for both sensitivity and response bias to be
calculated based on both training and experience.

To measure sensitivity, d’ was

calculated for each group. To measure response bias, β was calculated for each group.

61

These values were then compared to look for differences between each training and
experience group. This provided the first level of insight into the subject’s ability to
make correct weather-related decisions and the ability of the training program to
successfully teach weather-related decision making.

Eye Tracking Data
The second set of data to be collected in this experiment was the eye tracking
data. Data was continuously collected during each of the 1800 weather decisions made in
the study. In order to manage the eye tracking data, areas of interest (AOIs) were
identified for each image. The ClearView eye tracking software was used label AOIs for
each image. In each image the following features were labeled if present: terrain, clear
sky, clouds, horizon, cloud base, cloud darkness, and water. These features were chosen
to be consistent with previous research findings (Wiggins, 1999). An example of a
labeled image can be seen below in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Areas of Interest in a VFR Image
With the AOIs identified for each image, scanpaths can then be compared using
traditional eye tracking metrics: average number of fixations, average fixation duration,
time to first fixation, and total gaze time. The average number of fixations is calculated
first counting the number of visual fixations in each AOI during each trial, and then
taking the average over all of the trials being compared. The average fixation duration
averages the amount of dwell time each fixation takes. The time until first fixation
records the average amount of time that passes in each trial before a fixation is made in a
given AOI. The total gaze time simply averages the total amount of time a person spends
looking in each AOI.
These measures are basis for comparing eye tracking data. Each metric was used
to compare experience groups and to compare subjects’ scanpaths before and after
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training.

Each group of data was then tested for significant differences between

experience groups and training conditions.

Weather Feature Identification Data
The final set of data was collected during the weather feature identification
portion of the study. The purpose of this data is to compare the image features that
subjects identified as being important with the weather features that they actually looked
at while making their decision. This will provide an interesting insight into how aware
subjects are as to what features they use when making decisions.
Each feature tag contains a set of X, Y coordinates corresponding to the location
of the important weather feature that the subject clicked on and labeled.

These

coordinates will first be categorized using the same AOIs from the eye tracking data. The
frequency of tags for each AOI can then be compared to see which features subjects think
are most important. The AOIs used in tags will then be compared directly to the eye
tracking AOI results.

This will provide an interesting comparison between which

features were most often tagged with the features most often looked at.
The next level of comparison involved directly comparing the feature tags to eye
tracking fixations for each trial. To make this comparison each individual image tag will
be compared to the scanpath from the corresponding trial.

Each subject’s tag was

checked to see if that subject had a visual fixation within a predetermined number of
pixels from the tag. A percentage of all tags having a corresponding visual fixation
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within a given distance can then be calculated. This percentage provides insight into how
consistently subjects actually looked at the features that they later identified as important.
The distance in pixels that was used to check for agreement was varied to give a
broader picture of fixation-tag consistency. When a larger distance value was used for
comparison, a high percentage of agreement would be expected. The distance values
were varied between 10 pixels and 200 pixels. A visual representation of the distance
value can be seen below in Figure 10.

Figure 10 Visual Representation of d Values
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
The results section of this study consists of three primary sets of data: the
subjects’ verbal response data, the eye tracking data, and the weather feature tag data.
Each will be analyzed to determine the effects of experience and effects of the training
program as they relate to weather-related decision making strategy and accuracy.
Response Accuracy
The response data consist of the verbal responses addressing the question of
whether each scene allowed for VFR flight. The accuracy of responses was determined
by comparing each subject’s response to the consensus opinion of the expert pilot panel.
Accuracy was determined over all trials and also by each of the three training conditions.
The accuracy data for each of the three experience groups over all trials are shown below
in Table 4. A breakout of decision accuracy by study image is available in Appendix E.
Table4: Accuracy of Responses by Experience Group

Non-Pilots
Low-Time Pilots
High-Time Pilots
All Subjects

Frequency
Correct Incorrect
439
161
425
175
455
145
1319
481

Percentage
Correct Incorrect
73.2%
26.8%
70.8%
29.2%
75.8%
24.2%
73.3%
26.7%

The results indicate that high-time pilots were the most accurate, followed by nonpilots, then low-time pilots. A two sample t-test was used to compare each possible pair
of experience groups to check for significant differences in performance. The results
indicated a significant difference between the mean performance of high-time and low-
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time pilots (t = 1.96, s). The non-pilot group was found not to differ significantly from
either the low-time (t = -.90, ns) or high-time pilots (t = 1.06, ns). High-time accuracy
being greater than low-time accuracy was expected, however finding non-pilots in
between the two pilot groups was surprising. It was expected that they would have the
lowest accuracy of the three groups.
The accuracy data was also calculated by each of the three training conditions: pretraining, post-training with new images, post-training with repeated images.

These

values are shown below in Table 5.
Table 5: Response Accuracy by Experience Group and Training Condition
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeated
n=

Non-Pilots

Low-Time

High-Time

All Subjects

143 (71.5%)
149 (74.5%)
147 (73.5%)
600

141 (70.5%)
138 (69.0%)
146 (73.0%)
600

150 (75.0%)
151 (75.5%)
154 (77.0%)
600

434 (72.3%)
438 (73.0%)
447 (74.5%)
1800

All subjects improved their performance after training when viewing the same images
they saw before training. These differences, however, failed to be significant. A twoway ANOVA found neither a main effect for experience (p = .148, ns) or training (p =
.686, ns) in terms of accuracy.
The accuracy data was also compared against a variety of demographic data collected
in the demographic questionnaire. Scatter plots of accuracy versus total flight hours,
recent flight hours, age at certification and recent flight hours are shown below in Figure
83. The plots show no strong relationships among any of the demographic variables and
decision accuracy.
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Accuracy vs Age at Cert., Total Hours, Instrument Hours, Recent Hours
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Figure 83: Scatter Plot of Accuracy vs. Several Demographic Variables
Signal Detection Theory Analysis
After calculating accuracy, responses were then coded using signal detection theory.
The results of this coding, both overall and by training condition, are shown in Table 6.
The “all subjects” category represents the combined data of all subjects. This group is
useful for analyzing the overall effects of training. Each training condition (e.g. PreTraining) within each subject group represents 200 total trials divided evenly between
VMC and IMC trials. The data in the “all subjects” group represents 600 trials at each
training condition.
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Table 6: Signal Detection Theory Results
Non Pilots
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeat
All

Hit
66.0%
82.0%
81.0%
76.3%

Miss
34.0%
18.0%
19.0%
23.7%

CR
77.0%
67.0%
66.0%
70.0%

FA
23.0%
33.0%
34.0%
30.0%

d'
1.151
1.355
1.290
1.241

c'
0.142
-0.175
-0.180
-0.078

Low-Time
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeat
All

72.0%
81.0%
91.0%
81.3%

28.0%
19.0%
9.0%
18.7%

69.0%
57.0%
55.0%
60.3%

31.0%
43.0%
45.0%
39.7%

1.079
1.054
1.466
1.152

-0.040
-0.333
-0.414
-0.273

High-Time
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeat
All

69.0%
89.0%
90.0%
82.7%

31.0%
11.0%
10.0%
17.3%

81.0%
62.0%
64.0%
69.0%

19.0%
38.0%
36.0%
31.0%

1.374
1.532
1.640
1.437

0.139
-0.301
-0.281
-0.155

All Subjects
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeat
All

69.0%
84.0%
87.3%
80.1%

31.0%
16.0%
12.7%
19.9%

75.7%
62.0%
61.7%
66.4%

24.3%
38.0%
38.3%
33.6%

1.191
1.300
1.439
1.270

0.084
-0.265
-0.294
-0.166

The d’ value, a measure of the ability to discriminate signal from noise, was found
to be greater than 1 for every subject group and training condition. This indicates there is
an overall ability by all subjects to distinguish between VMC and IMC conditions. On
the whole, subject’s ability to distinguish IMC conditions improved after training,
especially when viewing the scenes for the second time. The overall d’ value increased
from 1.191 before training to 1.300 and 1.439 after training while viewing new and
repeated images.
Of particular note to this study is the hit rate which corresponds to the percentage
of times when subjects correctly chose to divert when encountering adverse weather. Hit
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rate is perhaps the most important measure in the study as it represents a pilot
recognizing and avoiding flight into IMC. A graph of hit rate by training condition
within each experience group is shown below in Figure 14. Error bars representing the
standard error of the mean are included in the graph.
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Figure 14: Hit Rate by Subject Group and Training Condition
A comparison of hit rates within each group reveals a significant improvement for
all three groups after training (non-pilots: p = .005, s; low-time: p = .006, s; high-time: p
= .001, s). This improved hit rate represents a success of the training program. With the
improved hit rate, however, the data also show an increase in false alarm rate as seen in
Figure 15. Error bars representing the standard error of the mean are included in the
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graph. The false alarm rate indicates the rate which subjects decided to divert when
encountering conditions which were below VFR minimums.
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Figure 15: False Alarm Rate by Subject Group and Training Condition
The increased false alarm rate was not significant among non-pilots (p=.051, ns),
but was significant among low-time (p = .025, s) and high-time pilots (p = .01, s). This
indicates that after training, when pilots encountered VMC they were more likely to
divert instead of continuing their flight.
The combination of an increased hit rate along with an increased false alarm rate
represents a shift in response bias. These findings are consistent with the calculated
response bias statistic c’. Overall, the c’ value shifted from .084, a slight bias towards
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continuing flight, to a bias of not continuing flight after training with c’ values of -.265
and -.294 for new and repeated images respectively. At the experience group level, all
groups showed a decrease after training with the largest shift being seen among the nonpilot group. Before training, the low-time pilot group was the most conservative with a
value of -.04 while the high-time and non-pilot groups showed a similar slight bias
towards continuing on their flight around .14. The low-time pilot group remained the
most conservative after training with a c value of -.414.

Response Data: Six Months Later
In order to compare the long-term effects of training on participants’ decision
making, the group of non-pilot subjects were asked to rate the same 20 images from the
task six months after completing the training program and experiment. Seventeen of the
twenty participants completed the follow-up decision task. A comparison of response
accuracy and signal detection results are shown below in Table 7. The original response
data from the three subjects who failed to complete the follow-up were excluded in these
comparisons.
Table 7: Response Data Six Months Later
Pre-Training
Post-Training
6 Months Later

Accuracy
71.8%
75.0%
70.6%

Hit
66.0%
82.9%
84.7%

Miss
34.0%
17.1%
15.3%

CR
77.0%
67.1%
56.4%

FA
23.0%
32.9%
43.5%

d'
C
1.151 0.142
1.393 -0.256
1.187 -0.431

Six months after completing the training program, the subjects’ response accuracy
decreased from 75% post-training to 70.6%, lower even than the initial pre-training
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accuracy value of 71.8%. The decrease was not found to be significant between the six
months later conditions and either the pre-training (z=-.339, ns) or the post-training (z =
-1.29, ns). Accuracy, was thus not significantly different, immediately after, or six
months after completing the training program.
Participants’ hit rate, which represents correctly diverting when encountering
adverse weather, maintained the improvement seen after training six months later. The
hit rate of 84.7%, seen six months later, is not significantly different from the posttraining hit rate of 82.9% (z = -.44, ns), while remaining significantly improved over the
pre-training hit rate of 66.0% (z = -3.06, s). The participants’ correct rejection rate
decreased significantly from 67.1% after training to 56.4% after six months (z = -2.01, s).
The improvement in the discriminability statistic d’ seen initially after training (an
increase from 1.151 to 1.393) was not maintained after six months, decreasing down to
1.187.
Maintaining the improved hit rate while decreasing the correct rejection
percentage beyond the initial post-training decrease indicates that subjects maintained
and even increased the conservative bias developed after training. This is confirmed in
the decrease in the response bias statistic c from .142 pre-training to -.256 post-training
and then to -.431 after six months. Thus it is clear that the gain in response bias from the
training program was maintained after six months.
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Comparison of Scanpaths Before Training
An initial analysis of the eye tracking fixation data found that on some of the eye
tracking trials, no fixations were recorded. Overall, during 181 out of the 1,800 trials no
fixations were recorded. This accounts to around 10% of the trials failing to register a
fixation during the recording. Trials failing to capture scanpaths are a product of many
noise factors associated with collecting this type of data and are expected. These trials
were thus dropped for all eye tracking analysis.
For the first set of analysis only the trials completed before training were
analyzed. This was in order to capture differences in weather-related decision-making
strategies based on flight experience. Comparisons were made between the three groups
based on fixation count, average gaze time, fixation duration, and the average amount of
time until the first fixation on each weather feature. The first set of comparisons was
made using the average number of fixations on each weather feature. These results are
summarized below in Table 8. The total category represents the average number of total
fixations per trial; it is not a simple summation of fixations in the other categories as
some categories overlap.
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Table 8: Average Fixation Count Before Training
Weather Feature
Total

Terrain

Sky

Cloud

Horizon

Cloud Base

Darkness

Group
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Mean
11.85
6.52
5.71
2.32
1.25
1.31
2.78
1.59
1.62
6.72
3.61
2.78
1.73
1.16
1.32
1.29
0.73
0.74
1.82
1.02
0.63

St. Dev.
11.76
5.83
6.17
3.74
2.10
1.87
3.71
2.62
2.42
8.27
3.83
3.77
2.48
1.72
2.08
2.13
1.20
1.85
2.67
1.91
1.48

% of Total
*
*
*
19.61%
19.14%
22.98%
23.51%
24.39%
28.43%
56.75%
55.41%
48.78%
14.63%
17.77%
23.08%
10.91%
11.23%
13.05%
15.37%
15.67%
11.10%

*Percentages do not add to 100 due to overlapping AOIs

The results indicate non-pilots had highest number of fixations followed by lowtime pilots, then high-time pilots. Non-pilots also had the highest standard deviation of
the three groups.

Further, the non-pilot group had the highest average number of

fixations within each of the weather feature categories. Of particular note is the overall
average number of fixations per trial which was much higher with non-pilots (11.85
fixations/trial)

than

either

low-time

(6.52

fixations/trial)

or

high-time

(5.71

fixations/trial). Though non-pilots made more fixations before coming to a decision, the
distribution of fixations among weather features appears consistent with the pilot groups
when calculated as a percentage of total fixations. Within each experience group, the
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majority of fixations were located in the Cloud category (non-pilots: 6.72 fixations,
56.75% of total; low-time pilots: 3.61 fixations, 55.41% of total; high-time pilots: 2.78
fixations, 48.78% of total). The second highest number of fixations for each group was
found in the Sky category (non-pilots: 2.78 fixations, 23.51% of total; low-time: 1.59
fixations, 24.39% of total; high-time pilots: 1.62 fixations, 28.42% of total).
T-tests were used to determine statistically significant differences between groups
for each weather feature. A table showing the resulting t statistic for each comparison is
shown below in Table 9. The results of each T-test are shown in Appendix F.
Table 9: T-statistic for Fixation Count Comparisons Before Training
High vs. Low
High vs. Non
Low vs. Non

All Terrain Sky
-1.30 0.31
0.12
-6.40 -3.35 -3.62
-5.65 -3.50 -3.66

Cloud
-2.09
-6.01
-4.76

Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
0.80
0.08
-2.19
-1.77
-2.67
-5.38
-2.65
-3.20
-3.39

Bolded values indicate statistical significance

The results indicate multiple significant differences between the non-pilot group
and both pilot groups. Of the 14 comparisons between pilots groups and the non-pilot
group, only one (high-time and non-pilots in the horizon category) failed to prove
significant. This suggests that having some flight experience and training does indeed
affect the weather-related decision-making process. The non-pilots in the study required
significantly more fixations in nearly every category compared to either pilot group.
Comparisons between the two groups of pilots show significant differences
between only two of the seven categories, Cloud and Cloud Darkness. In both cases,
low-time pilots made significantly more fixations than high-time pilots. Otherwise, no
significant differences, in terms of the number of fixation made, were seen between the
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pilot groups in terms of fixation count. Both groups acquired a similar amount of visual
information from each scene.
Data was also analyzed based on the total gaze time for each weather feature.
While related to the average fixation time, total gaze time includes all eye movements
within a given AOI. The “Total” category represents the average gaze time for each trial.
Again, the “Total” category is not a summation of the other categories due to overlapping
AOIs. The average gaze time results are shown below in Table 10.
Table 10: Average Gaze Time before Training
Weather Feature
Total

Terrain

Sky

Cloud

Horizon

Cloud Base

Darkness

Group
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Mean
St. Dev.
4769.57 5264.55
3437.99 3398.45
3130.38 4643.01
956.60
1777.30
689.96
1209.31
746.47
1244.55
1170.38 1730.58
869.12
1772.55
959.04
1769.44
2662.64 3499.27
1836.02 2053.75
1435.72 2694.42
769.45
1290.32
641.49
1086.91
732.73
1508.85
528.77
981.54
389.86
697.93
439.07
1327.65
747.85
1202.87
527.13
1055.09
264.98
631.97

% of Total
*
*
*
20.06%
20.07%
23.85%
24.54%
25.28%
30.64%
55.83%
53.40%
45.86%
16.13%
18.66%
23.41%
11.09%
11.34%
14.03%
15.68%
15.33%
8.46%

*Percentages do not add to 100 due to overlapping AOIs

Consistent with the results of the fixation count, non-pilots showed the largest
amount of average gaze time per image followed by low-time, then high-time pilots.
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Again, the Cloud category had the highest gaze time for all groups, followed by the Sky
category. Interestingly, the high-time pilots spent very little time looking at the areas of
cloud darkness in the images while both low-time and non-pilots spent around 15% of
their gaze time on these areas.
T-tests were used to determine statistically significant differences between groups
for each weather feature. A table showing the resulting t statistic for each comparison is
shown below in Table 11. The results of each t-test are available in Appendix G.
Table 11: T-test Statistics for Gaze Time Comparisons Before Training
High vs. Low
High vs. Non
Low vs. Non

All Terrain Sky
-0.72 0.44
0.49
-3.21 -1.34 -1.17
-2.96 -1.73 -1.69

Cloud
-1.60
-3.83
-2.84

Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
0.66
0.44
-2.92
-0.25
-0.74
-4.93
-1.05
-1.61
-1.92

Bolded values indicate statistical significance

In order to gain insights into scanning patterns, the average number of fixations
per trial was divided by the average gaze time for each trial giving the average
fixations/second by each group. The non-pilot group had the highest number of
fixations/second with a value of 2.48 fixations/second. Low-time pilots had the second
highest fixations/second rate at 1.90 followed by high-time pilots at 1.82. This suggests
that high-time pilots’ behavior involved more scanning than fixating when compared to
non-pilots.

This suggests that pilots were looking for specific features which they

scanned for until they saw them whereas non-pilots tended to rapidly fixate on many
features until they came to an answer. These results are shown below in Table 12.
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Table 12: Average Fixations per Second Before Training
Group
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Gaze Time
4769.57
3437.99
3130.38

Fixations
11.85
6.52
5.71

Fixation/Second
2.48
1.90
1.82

The average duration of each groups’ fixations on various features was also
analyzed. In this case “Total” represents the overall average fixation duration for each
group. The average fixation duration for each group and weather feature was calculated
and shown below in Table 13.
Table 13: Average Fixation Duration Before Training
Weather Feature
Total

Terrain

Sky

Cloud

Horizon

Cloud Base

Darkness

Group
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Mean
387.16
516.42
506.35
386.05
544.84
543.34
403.65
505.98
530.57
378.23
511.91
472.54
436.79
530.83
527.32
385.81
534.41
512.82
397.44
493.41
439.78

St. Dev.
124.32
142.70
167.86
152.66
172.68
211.70
153.31
180.61
217.14
140.66
164.27
180.37
247.44
192.46
266.63
142.25
201.59
251.89
175.01
155.79
193.76

The average fixation data shows again a large overall difference between the nonpilot and pilot groups. The average fixation duration for non-pilots was lower than both
pilot groups lasting an average of 387ms compared to 516ms and 506ms for low-time and
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high-time pilots.

Non-pilots had the lowest standard deviation indicating consistent

fixations lasting around 387ms, while pilot groups showed more variation.
T-tests were used to determine statistically significant differences between groups
for each weather feature. A table showing the resulting t statistic for each comparison is
shown below in Table 14. The results of each t-test are shown in Appendix H.
Table 14: T-test Statistics for Fixation Duration Comparisons Before Training
All Terrain Sky
High vs. Low -0.62 -0.05 0.88
High vs. Non 7.77 6.22 4.96
Low vs. Non 9.48 6.95 4.63

Cloud Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
-1.97 -0.10
-0.52
-1.67
5.13
2.57
3.43
1.33
8.05
3.17
5.29
4.03

Bol ded val ue s i ndicate s tati s ti cal s i gni fi cance

Again, both groups of pilots exhibit similar behavior, while differing significantly
from the non-pilot group. The only difference between pilot groups is seen in the cloud
group where high-time pilots’ fixations were significantly shorter than low-time pilots’
fixations. Of the 14 comparisons between the pilot groups and the non-pilot group, 13
were significant with non-pilots having shorter fixations in all cases. This suggests an
overall behavior among non-pilots of many quick fixations spread throughout the image,
whereas pilots tended to make fewer, longer fixations before making a decision.
The final set of data used to compare experience groups was the average time
until the first fixation was made on a given feature. This indicates where subjects’
attention was first drawn to when viewing an image. The results are shown below in
Table 15.
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Table 15: Average Time Until First Fixation
Weather Feature
Total

Terrain

Sky

Cloud

Horizon

Cloud Base

Darkness

Group
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Mean
St. Dev.
695.85
1078.65
736.64
2137.48
684.91
1062.57
2596.35 2304.95
3089.50 4313.34
2488.00 3441.37
1958.94 2861.47
3152.55 6981.82
1921.60 1817.87
1158.26 1666.71
1391.19 4426.75
994.26
1503.32
2504.77 2435.98
3691.88 7218.10
2274.45 3038.00
2418.21 2660.30
3561.01 7012.13
2371.78 2569.69
2628.99 4593.00
3457.47 6645.43
3050.33 3052.82

In the total condition, which represents the time until any fixation was made,
high-time pilots made a fixation the quickest, followed by non-pilots, then low-time
pilots. It should be noted that this set of data is highly variable, as evident by the high
standard deviation values, indicating that on the whole, there was not a very consistent
viewing strategy. All groups did on average look at the cloud feature, then the sky
feature before looking at the other features.
T-tests were used to determine statistically significant differences between groups
for each weather feature. A table showing the resulting t statistic for each comparison is
shown below in Table 16. The results of each t-test are shown in Appendix I.
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Table 16: T-test Statistic for Time to First Fixation Comparisons Before Training
High vs. Low
High vs. Non
Low vs. Non

All Terrain Sky
-1.99 -1.05 -1.76
-0.11 -0.27 1.66
1.85 0.99 -0.12

Cloud
-1.07
-0.93
0.63

Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
-0.05
-1.32
-0.48
-0.60
-0.11
0.69
1.54
1.30
0.97

Bolded values indicate statistical significance

Among the comparisons made between groups only the comparison of high-time
vs. low-time pilots among all features showed a significant difference. High-time pilots
made fixations more quickly than low-time pilots in this study. None of the other
comparisons were significant. The lack of significance is an indication of a lack of
consistent viewing strategy and is also seen in the high standard deviations for the data.

Effects of Training on Scanpaths
Eye tracking data was further used to compare subjects’ viewing patterns after
completing the WeatherWise training program. The analysis was directed at two primary
research questions: how did each group’s data after training compare to the data before
training and how similar do the three groups look after training. The first set of data was
analyzed by comparing fixation counts after training. The data is summarized below in
Table 17.
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Table 17: Average Fixation Count by Training Feature
Variable
All

Terrain

Sky

Cloud

Horizon

Cloud Base

Darkness

Group
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots

Pre-Training
Mean
StDev
5.71
6.17
6.52
5.83
11.85
11.76
1.31
1.87
1.25
2.10
2.32
3.74
1.62
2.42
1.59
2.62
2.79
3.71
2.78
3.77
3.61
3.83
6.72
8.27
1.32
2.08
1.16
1.72
1.73
2.48
0.74
1.85
0.73
1.20
1.29
2.13
0.63
1.48
1.02
1.91
1.82
2.67

Post-Training New
Mean
StDev
5.40
4.90
6.20
5.76
9.14
7.19
1.15
2.04
0.92
1.67
1.58
2.58
2.01
2.68
2.03
2.73
2.34
2.97
2.23
2.54
3.22
3.97
5.17
5.67
1.40
2.10
1.17
1.96
1.42
1.61
0.53
0.90
0.77
1.22
0.99
1.37
0.50
1.05
0.83
1.53
1.35
2.12

Post-Training Repeat
Mean
StDev
3.74
3.64
4.63
4.87
7.22
6.02
0.61
1.36
0.65
1.31
1.04
1.69
1.36
2.14
1.57
2.80
2.33
3.32
1.71
1.96
2.36
2.76
3.79
3.81
0.81
1.32
0.81
1.45
1.09
1.30
0.50
0.93
0.62
1.77
0.92
1.34
0.35
0.75
0.55
0.97
0.87
1.42

A large reduction in fixations is seen in all cases when subjects viewed the same
images they had seen in the first part of the study. This is expected due to the subject’s
familiarity with the image from the first portion of the study and can be attributed solely
to training. As a result, the analysis will focus on the pre-training and post-training new
data sets.
The results show the largest reduction in the number of fixations among the nonpilot group decreasing from 11.85 fixations/image to 9.14 fixations/image when viewing
new images after training. T-tests were run to compare the groups’ fixation counts after
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the training completing the training program. The t-statistics for each test are shown
below in Table 18. The results of each test are shown in Appendix J.
Table 18: T-test Statistic for Fixation Count Comparisons After Training
All Terrain Sky Cloud Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
High vs. Low -1.39 1.12 -0.07 -2.77
1.04
-2.08
-2.38
High vs. Non -5.75 -1.74 -1.11 -6.44 -0.08
-3.83
-4.91
Low vs. Non -4.36 -2.95 -1.07 -3.86 -1.32
-1.7
-2.72
Bol ded val ue s i ndicate s tati s ti cal s i gni fi cance

The results of the t-tests show that after training there are fewer significant
differences between the non-pilots and the pilot groups. Where 12 of the 14 comparisons
were significantly different before training, after training only 8 of the 14 were different.
This is an indication that after training non-pilots’ scanpaths have become more similar to
pilot’s scanpaths.
T-tests were also run to compare the fixation count results before and after
training for each group. Negative t values indicate a decrease in fixations for a given
feature after training. The t-test statistics are shown below in Table 19.
Table 19: T-test Statistic for Fixation Count Comparisons of Pre- vs. Post-Training
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots

All
-0.5
-0.52
-2.73

Terrain Sky Cloud Horizon Cloud Base Darkness
-0.74 1.37 -1.6
0.37
-1.39
-0.98
-1.65 1.57 -0.96
0.07
0.29
-1.04
-2.27 -1.29 -2.16 -1.49
-1.64
-1.91
Bol ded val ue s i ndicate s tati s ti cal s i gni fi cance

The results indicate no significant differences in fixation counts for either the
high-time or low-time group after completing the training program. The non-pilot group,
on the other hand, showed a significant reduction in fixations for four of the seven
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categories, including overall number of fixations. The non-pilot group required fewer
fixations on these feature to make a weather decision.
The average fixation duration was also compared before and after training. These
results are shown below in Table 20.
Table 20: Average Fixation Duration
Weather Feature Group
Total
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Terrain
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Sky
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Cloud
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Horizon
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Cloud Base Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time
Darkness
Non-Pilots
Low-Time
High-Time

Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Mean St. Dev. Mean
St. Dev.
387.16 124.32 405.42
147.23
516.42 142.70 536.81
150.12
506.35 167.86 534.24
217.91
386.05 152.66 411.55
247.96
544.84 172.68 507.70
180.51
543.34 211.70 509.02
187.64
403.65 153.31 413.77
150.28
505.98 180.61 579.76
225.54
530.57 217.14 609.04
276.01
378.23 140.66 381.43
125.32
511.91 164.27 507.97
145.37
472.54 180.37 487.50
202.81
436.79 247.44 446.95
245.61
530.83 192.46 560.27
204.42
527.32 266.63 581.42
263.33
385.81 142.25 398.36
178.27
534.41 201.59 524.59
184.93
512.82 251.89 490.58
276.08
397.44 175.01 375.83
162.01
493.41 155.79 480.58
157.81
439.78 193.76 442.12
163.33

All groups showed an increase in overall average fixation duration after
completing the training program. The results show high and low-time pilots to have
similar durations, with non-pilots have much shorter fixation durations.

A t-test

comparing average fixation duration between groups shows the difference between hightime and low-time to be non-significant (t=-.609, ns), whereas the difference between
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both pilot groups and the non-pilot were both significant (high-time t = 11.7, s) (low-time
t = 15.8, s).
The changes in fixation duration were also analyzed across all experience groups.
The average and standard deviation for each training condition are shown below in Table
21.
Table 21: Average Fixation Duration by Training Condition
Condition
Pre-Training
Post-Training New
Post-Training Repeat

Average
464.89
487.64
494.15

St. Dev.
160.58
184.64
223.83

The results show that the average fixation duration increases after participants
complete the training program. A single factor ANOVA run on the training condition
confirms training as a significant effect (p = .034, s). These results combined with the
results of fixation count analysis indicate that the training program decreases the number
of visual fixations while increasing the average duration of each fixation.
Weather Feature Tags
As a part of the experimental task, participants used a mouse to click on the
features in each image they deemed relevant to determining if conditions were above
VFR minimums. By clicking on a part of an image, the subject tagged that specific
location as important. The exact location of each tag was thus captured. A review of the
number of tags identified in each weather scene is shown below in Table 22.
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Table 22: Number of Tags Identified by Each Experience Group
Group
High-Time
Low-Time
Non-Pilots

Total Tags Tags/Scene
433
2.17
362
1.81
364
1.82

St. Dev.
1.40
0.92
0.88

A clear distinction can be drawn between the high-time pilots and the other two
groups. High-time pilots deemed significantly more features in each image as being
significant (high vs. low: t=3.00, s; high vs. non: t = 2.95, s). Low-time pilots tagged
slightly fewer features than the non-pilots, though the difference was not significant (low
vs. non: t = -.01).
Each of the image tags was also categorized using the same AOIs defined for the
eye-tracking analysis. These data are shown below in percentages in Table 23.
Table 23: Image Tags Categorized by Areas of Interest
Terrain
Sky
Cloud Hoizon Cloud Base Darkness
High-Time 10.85% 32.79% 54.50% 19.40%
18.01%
14.55%
Low-Time 10.77% 23.48% 66.57% 13.54%
18.78%
25.41%
Non-Pilots 6.87% 26.65% 60.71% 15.38%
16.21%
28.02%

The results of categorizing the tags show notable differences between groups in
several categories. High-time pilots tagged the Horizon in 19.40% of their tags compared
to 15.38% for non-pilots and 13.54% for low-time pilots. High-time pilots found this
region more important than the other groups. The converse was found with the Cloud
Darkness feature; non-pilots tagged this feature with 28.02% of their tags, followed by
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low-time pilots at 25.41% and then high-time pilots at 14.55%. It is clear that the more
experienced participants rated these areas as less important.
Comparisons of the weather feature tags and visual fixations based on the
identified AOIs were also completed for each experience group.

A graph of the

percentage breakdowns for fixations and tags for each experience group are shown below
in Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18.
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Figure 16: Tags vs. Fixations by Weather Feature Among Non-Pilots
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Low-Time Pilots
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Figure 17: Tags vs. Fixations by Weather Feature Among Low-Time Pilots

High-Time Pilots
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Figure 18: Tags vs. Fixations by Weather Feature Among High-Time Pilots
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All three groups show a higher percentage of fixations on the Terrain than the
percentage of tags on the Terrain. This indicates that even though subjects did not
consider the terrain that relevant to the weather-related decision task, they still allocated a
high percentage of their gaze time to that feature.
The subjects’ weather feature tags were then compared to their visual fixations.
Each weather feature tag was checked against the corresponding subject’s scanpath in
their original decision trial to see if there was a corresponding fixation. If there was a
fixation within a given distance there was considered agreement between the tag and the
scanpath. This agreement distance was calculated for each experience group at 10 pixel
intervals from 10 pixels to 200 pixels. The graph of each group’s agreement distance is
shown below in Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Tag Fixation Agreement Percentage by Agreement Distance
The results show a steady incline in all groups as the agreement distance is
increased. There is a slight separation between the pilot and non-pilot groups, especially
between 60 and 90 pixels and again from 170 to 200 pixels. The two pilot groups, again
show very similar results with only a slight separation at 90 pixels where high-time pilots
have slightly higher agreement percentage.
A series of 2-proportion z-tests were run on the results to determine where
statistically significant results were seen. The z-values for these tests are shown below in
Table 24. The full results of each test are shown in Appendix K.
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Table 24: Z-values for 2 Proportion Z-test Comparisons at Different Agreement
Distances
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
High vs. Low -0.99 -0.51 -0.47 0.25 0.29 -0.08 0.09 0.24 0.98 0.19
High vs. Non 2.01 0.67 -0.38 0.69 0.87 1.35 1.55 2.01 1.86 0.84
Low vs. Non 2.67 1.06 0.08 0.44 0.58 1.41 1.45 1.75 0.87 0.64

150
0.27
0.90
0.62

200
0.51
2.01
1.49

Bold values indicate significant differences at α=.05 level

The 2-proportion z-test results indicate few significant differences between the
experience groups at the various agreement differences.

As with other tests, no

significant differences are seen between low-time and high-time pilots. A difference is
seen at the 10 pixel agreement difference between the pilot groups and the non-pilot
group. While this indicates that pilots had higher chance of fixating on the same point
that they identified as important, it should be noted that smallness of the percentages
being compared is likely magnifying the z-value. Statistical differences are also seen
between the high-time and non-pilot group at the 80 pixel and 200 pixel agreement
distances. In both cases high-time pilots had a higher agreement percentage than the nonpilots.
Considering that non-pilots made around twice as many fixations as either pilot
group, it is surprising that they did not have a higher percentage of feature tags with a
corresponding fixation. High-time pilots, on the other hand, had the highest number of
tags which were compared against the fewest number of fixations and still maintained an
equal or higher agreement percentage compared to the other groups.

92

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions from this study are divided into three sections based on research
contributions identified in chapter 1. The first contribution centers on developing a better
understanding of pilot decision-making strategies as they relate to flight experience. The
second contribution focuses on using eye-tracking to evaluate training effectiveness.
Finally, the third contribution of the study is a better understanding of how aware people
are of the visual information they use when making a decision.

Pilot Decision Making Strategy
The study yielded many interesting findings regarding decision making by each of
the three experience groups. In terms of overall decision accuracy, high-time pilots were
the most accurate, statistically more accurate than low-time pilots.

Interestingly,

however, non-pilots’ accuracy was greater than low-time pilots’ accuracy. This ranking
of groups was consistent over each of the training conditions. This could be a result of
low-time pilots’ being able to quickly identify the key features in an image, but lacking
the knowledge and experience necessary to correctly identify the importance of the
features. This is supported by the similarity of scanpaths between the experience groups.
The signal detection results informed the decision accuracy results, shedding
more light into the types of decisions each group made. Overall, each group showed an
ability to discriminate the signal (IMC) as evidenced by d’ values greater than one. This
provides credibility to the images’ ability convey instrument conditions.
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Like the

accuracy data, the highest discriminability value was held by the high-time pilots,
followed by non-pilots, and then low-time pilots.
While being the least accurate of the three groups and having the lowest
discriminability value, the low-time pilots did prove to be the most conservative in their
decision making.

Low-time pilots showed a relatively neutral bias slightly shifted

towards not continuing a flight, while both high-time and non-pilots showed moderate
biases towards continuing their flights. Low-time pilots likely have been trained to be
more conservative regarding weather as they are learning and gaining experience. While
being considerably more conservative than the other groups, however, low-time pilots
still showed a neutral bias compared to a conservative bias that might be expected.
High-time pilots likely were more aggressive in their decisions because most had
the skills and certifications to continue the flight if not operating under visual flight rules.
Non-pilots, on the other hand, likely were prone to continuing flights due to a lack of
experience with estimating weather conditions as well as a lack of understanding of the
real-life consequences associated with flying into adverse weather. This represents a
perfect opportunity for training to improve decision making behavior.
The demographic data collected in the questionnaire failed to show any
meaningful correlations with decision accuracy. While other studies have suggested
values such as instrument flight hours, recent flight hours, and age at initial certification
are correlated with weather-related decision making ability, this was not seen in the
current study. It is possible that these demographic features still play a role in weather
accidents, however their effects were not seen in the current study.
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In terms of information acquisition strategy, analyses of visual scanpath behavior
showed a clear difference between the non-pilots and the pilot groups. Non-pilot
scanpaths consisted of shorter, more frequent fixations spread around the images. Nonpilots averaged around twice as many fixations as either pilot group with fixation
durations considerably shorter as well. This finding is consistent with previous novice vs.
expert research, wherein, novices lack the discernment to distinguish relevant information
and, in turn, tend to gather as much information as possible.
Comparisons of the two groups of pilots’ scanpaths showed more similarities than
differences. Overall fixation count and gaze time showed few differences between the
groups. The primary group difference was that low-time pilots fixated more frequently
on the clouds, in particular on the areas of darkness in the clouds. It is likely that lowtime pilots found these features particularly salient due to their lack of experience flying
in adverse weather. High-time pilots’ experience likely led to their ability to diagnosis
the importance of cloud darkness in fewer fixations than low-time pilots.

Effectiveness of Cue-Based Training
On the whole, the training program WeatherWise was found to be an effective
method of teaching weather-related decision making and reducing the number of
simulated flights into adverse weather.

Ideally, the program would have improved

decision accuracy; however this was not seen in the results. Every group did maintain the
same level of accuracy after training, while at the same time becoming more conservative
in their decision making. In many contexts simply shifting response bias would not be
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considered a success; however, in high-risk scenarios this can be quite effective. A
reduction in the number of flights continued into adverse weather at the cost of an
increase in unnecessary diversions would be a worthwhile trade.
To increase decision accuracy, improvements to the training program should be
focused on the first section of the program, Weather to Fly. This section specifically
focuses on identifying cues that indicate a pilot should not continue on their flight. The
use of higher quality images in this section and some method of highlighting specific
weather features in each image would likely improve this section of the training program.
In terms of scanpaths, WeatherWise appeared to have the largest effects on the
non-pilot group. Non-pilots saw the largest reduction in fixations after training. Further,
their scanpaths looked much more similar to the pilot groups after completing the
training. Overall comparisons made between non-pilots and pilots in terms of fixations
on each weather feature found significant differences in 13 of the 14 comparisons made
before training while only finding 8 of 14 significant differences after training. This
shows non-pilots looked much more like pilots after completing the training program.
Another indication of the WeatherWise’s success comes with the non-pilot data
collected six months after the initial trials. The results found that while accuracy was
slightly lower than after training, that the subjects’ conservative bias had actually become
even stronger after six months. Thus the main message of the training program, not to
risk continuing a flight into adverse weather, was still evident in the subject’s responses.
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Visual Information Awareness
A secondary research question addressed in this study concerned people’s
knowledge of the visual information they use when making a decision. The question was
addressed through direct comparisons of subjects’ fixations with the image features the
subjects tagged as being relevant. All three groups showed a similar degree of agreement
between the features subjects tagged as important and the features that they actually
looked at. Again, both pilot groups performed similarly with no significant differences
being seen. The pilot groups generally had higher levels agreement than the non-pilots
though the differences were only significant at a few points.
On the whole, there was a noticeably low level of agreement between fixations
and tags. Every tag was compared to fixations from the corresponding trial. All groups
had considerably more fixations than tags, yet often the features a subject identified as
important were not something they had actually looked at. In particular, non-pilots
averaged 1.82 tags per scene and 11.85 fixations per scene, and yet only 40% of those
tags had a corresponding fixation within 100 pixels. The pilot groups showed similar
results while only making around half as many fixations. This indicates the pilot groups
did have a better idea of the visual information gathered when making a decision. It also
indicates they were more efficient with their visual scans, fixating on what they deemed
important with fewer extraneous fixations.
It appears, then, that task-related experience does improve a person’s awareness
of the visual information used to make a decision. The overall level of agreement
between what a person says is important and what they actually look at still seems quite
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low. This suggests that people are, in fact, often unaware of the visual information they
use to make a decision. This potentially casts doubt on the reliability of self-report data
regarding visual information. Further research directed specifically at the phenomenon is
needed to verify these findings.

Limitations of the Current Study
The current study does have some inherent limitations that should be considered
when discussing the results. One primary limitation is the weather images used as stimuli
in the experiment. Looking at photographs and making decisions is certainly different
than looking at the weather out of the window while in flight. It is likely that decision
accuracy would have been higher in real-life scenarios; however, this is just not feasible
in an experimental setting given the resources available for the study.
It is understood that weather-related decision making in an actual flight is a
continual process made through the course of a flight. Using in-flight videos from actual
or simulated flights could have provided better accuracy data, though there are several
advantages of using still images and individual decisions. First, it allows for the all of the
information that is tracked for a given decision to be captured. If viewing a long video, it
would be very difficult to identify when pilot began making the decision to divert. As
decisions were made in around 5 seconds on average, showing very short video clips
would likely have provided little more information than was available in the still picture.
There are also advantages from the eye tracking data analysis perspective, in that defining
areas of interest is much more complicated in video files versus still pictures.
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Another potential limitation of the study comes from the population of pilots used
in the study. It is likely that the geographic region a pilot typically flies in affects the
way they view the weather. All of the pilots in this study were from the same area of the
country, though some did express having considerable flight experience in other areas of
the country. This is due primarily to the resources available to complete the research
study. Having a population with a similar geographic background does reduce a potential
noise factor when aggregating data and making comparisons.

Future Research
There are many ways in which this research could be continued in the future, both
in the general aviation context and in other domains. A natural follow-up on the general
aviation side would be to increase the fidelity of the weather scenarios, either through
videos recorded during actual flights or through using a high-fidelity flight simulator.
Either of these options will have the limitations identified previously, mainly an increase
in resources to run the study and analyze the data. The increased cost and effort would,
however, provide an even stronger picture of the decision making process and thus,
should be considered.
Another option would be expanding the physiological measures used to
understand the decision making process. The study of brainwaves through EEG and other
measures

of

brain

activity

could

potentially

enhance

this

understanding.

Electroencephalography (EEG) offers the ability to measure brainwaves through
detecting electrical impulses that result from neurons in the brain firing. This technology
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is perhaps immature for use in measuring complex brain functions, though it is worth
considering in the future.
One of the primary contributions provided by this research is a methodology for
studying the effects of training using eye tracking. A natural extension of the current
research would therefore entail extending this methodology to another domain. There are
many domains with primarily visual tasks that could benefit from incorporating eye
tracking into the development and testing of training programs. In air traffic control, for
example, the controller’s primary task involves visually monitoring radar scopes to
identify potential conflicts in aircraft trajectory.

Controllers complete a variety of

training programs during initial certification and in annual recertification programs. It
would be both interesting and beneficial to assess which programs were actually
improving or changing the controllers’ scanning behavior. An analysis of experience
differences as they relate to scanning would also be beneficial. A very similar study
could be completed, replacing the weather decision task with a radar monitoring task, to
answer some of these questions. Other potential areas that could benefit from this type of
training include doctors viewing x-rays, airport baggage screeners, security guards, and
quality control workers among others.
Overall, this study yielded several sound research contributions regarding
weather-related decision making and the benefits of eye tracking for analyzing decision
behavior and training effectiveness. It is hoped that this work will be built upon in the
future and expanded into other domains.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AOPA

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

EEG

Electroencephalography

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAR

Federal Aviation Regulation

GA

General Aviation

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

SDT

Signal Detection Theory

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions
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APPENDIX B
PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT FLYER

(E-Mail Address)
(Phone Number)
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APPENDIX C
WEATHER IMAGES USED IN THE STUDY
VMC Conditions

104

IMC Conditions
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APPENDIX D
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX E
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
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(Phone Number)
(Phone Number)
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APPENDIX F
EXPERIMENT SCRIPT
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111
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APPENDIX G
ACCURACY RATINGS FOR EACH IMAGE
Non-Pilots Low-time High-Time
A1
93.3%
96.7%
90.0%
A2
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
A3
93.3%
76.7%
86.7%
A4
80.0%
56.7%
50.0%
A5
66.7%
83.3%
83.3%
A6
96.7%
90.0%
90.0%
A7
30.0%
63.3%
60.0%
A8
73.3%
56.7%
63.3%
A9
83.3%
90.0%
86.7%
A10
43.3%
53.3%
63.3%
B1
70.0%
80.0%
86.7%
B2
53.3%
43.3%
56.7%
B3
96.7%
96.7%
96.7%
B4
46.7%
23.3%
50.0%
B5
76.7%
80.0%
80.0%
B6
73.3%
76.7%
86.7%
B7
63.3%
53.3%
60.0%
B8
80.0%
53.3%
63.3%
B9
90.0%
90.0%
96.7%
B10
93.3%
80.0%
86.7%
Overall
73.2%
70.8%
75.8%

Group A Accuracy: 73.70%
Group B Accuracy: 72.78%
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APPENDIX H
T-TESTS COMPARING PRE-TRAINING FIXATION
COUNTS BETWEEN GROUPS
High-time Pilots vs. Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 5.71 6.17 0.46
low 190 6.52 5.83 0.42
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.810
95% CI for difference: (-2.039, 0.418)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.30 P-Value = 0.195 DF = 363

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1.31 1.87 0.14
low 190 1.25 2.10 0.15
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.064
95% CI for difference: (-0.342, 0.470)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.31 P-Value = 0.758 DF = 366

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1.62 2.42 0.18
low 190 1.59 2.62 0.19
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.033
95% CI for difference: (-0.483, 0.549)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.12 P-Value = 0.901 DF = 367

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 2.78 3.77 0.28
low 190 3.61 3.83 0.28
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.827
95% CI for difference: (-1.604, -0.050)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.09 P-Value = 0.037 DF = 367

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group

N Mean StDev SE Mean
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hig 180 1.32 2.08
low 190 1.16 1.72

0.15
0.12

Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.159
95% CI for difference: (-0.232, 0.550)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.80 P-Value = 0.425 DF = 348

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 0.74 1.85 0.14
low 190 0.73 1.20 0.087
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.013
95% CI for difference: (-0.308, 0.334)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.08 P-Value = 0.937 DF = 305

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 0.63 1.48 0.11
low 190 1.02 1.91 0.14
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.388
95% CI for difference: (-0.736, -0.040)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.19 P-Value = 0.029 DF = 354

High-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 5.71 6.17 0.46
non 195 11.8 11.8 0.84
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -6.141
95% CI for difference: (-8.029, -4.252)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6.40 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 298

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1.31 1.87 0.14
non 195 2.32 3.74 0.27
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.012
95% CI for difference: (-1.606, -0.418)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.35 P-Value = 0.001 DF = 290
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Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1.62 2.42 0.18
non 195 2.78 3.71 0.27
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.162
95% CI for difference: (-1.794, -0.530)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.62 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 336

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 2.78 3.77 0.28
non 195 6.72 8.27 0.59
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -3.940
95% CI for difference: (-5.230, -2.650)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6.01 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 275

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1.32 2.08 0.15
non 195 1.73 2.48 0.18
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.417
95% CI for difference: (-0.880, 0.047)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.77 P-Value = 0.078 DF = 369

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 0.74 1.85 0.14
non 195 1.29 2.13 0.15
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.548
95% CI for difference: (-0.951, -0.144)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.67 P-Value = 0.008 DF = 371

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 0.63 1.48 0.11
non 195 1.82 2.67 0.19
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.187
95% CI for difference: (-1.621, -0.753)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.38 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 307
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Low-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 6.52 5.83 0.42
non 195 11.8 11.8 0.84
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -5.330
95% CI for difference: (-7.186, -3.475)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.65 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 285

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 1.25 2.10 0.15
non 195 2.32 3.74 0.27
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.076
95% CI for difference: (-1.681, -0.470)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.50 P-Value = 0.001 DF = 306

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 1.59 2.62 0.19
non 195 2.78 3.71 0.27
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.195
95% CI for difference: (-1.838, -0.552)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.66 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 349

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 3.61 3.83 0.28
non 195 6.72 8.27 0.59
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -3.113
95% CI for difference: (-4.400, -1.825)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.76 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 275

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 1.16 1.72 0.12
non 195 1.73 2.48 0.18
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.575
95% CI for difference: (-1.003, -0.148)
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T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.65 P-Value = 0.008 DF = 346

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 0.73 1.20 0.087
non 195 1.29 2.13 0.15
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.561
95% CI for difference: (-0.906, -0.216)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.20 P-Value = 0.002 DF = 308

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 1.02 1.91 0.14
non 195 1.82 2.67 0.19
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.799
95% CI for difference: (-1.263, -0.336)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.39 P-Value = 0.001 DF = 351
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APPENDIX I
T-TESTS COMPARING PRE-TRAINING GAZE TIME
BETWEEN GROUPS
High-time Pilots vs. Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 3130 4643 346
low 190 3438 3398 247
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -308
95% CI for difference: (-1144, 528)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.72 P-Value = 0.470 DF = 327

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 746 1245
93
low 190 690 1209 88
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 57
95% CI for difference: (-195, 308)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.44 P-Value = 0.658 DF = 365

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 959 1769 132
low 190 869 1773 129
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 90
95% CI for difference: (-272, 452)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.49 P-Value = 0.626 DF = 366

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1436 2694 201
low 190 1836 2054 149
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -400
95% CI for difference: (-892, 92)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.60 P-Value = 0.110 DF = 334

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group

N Mean StDev SE Mean
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hig 180 733 1509
low 190 641 1087

112
79

Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 91
95% CI for difference: (-179, 361)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.66 P-Value = 0.507 DF = 324

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 439 1328 99
low 190 390 698 51
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 49
95% CI for difference: (-170, 268)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.44 P-Value = 0.658 DF = 267

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 265 632 47
low 190 527 1055 77
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -262.1
95% CI for difference: (-439.0, -85.3)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.92 P-Value = 0.004 DF = 312

High-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 3130 4643 346
non 196 4770 5265 376
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1639
95% CI for difference: (-2644, -634)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.21 P-Value = 0.001 DF = 373

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 746 1245
93
non 196 957 1777 127
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -210
95% CI for difference: (-519, 99)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.34 P-Value = 0.182 DF = 350
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Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 959 1769 132
non 196 1170 1731 124
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -211
95% CI for difference: (-567, 144)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.17 P-Value = 0.243 DF = 369

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 1436 2694 201
non 196 2663 3499 250
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1227
95% CI for difference: (-1857, -596)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.83 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 363

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 733 1509 112
non 196 769 1290
92
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -37
95% CI for difference: (-323, 249)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.25 P-Value = 0.801 DF = 353

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 439 1328 99
non 196 529 982 70
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -90
95% CI for difference: (-328, 149)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.74 P-Value = 0.460 DF = 327

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 265 632 47
non 196 748 1203 86
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -482.9
95% CI for difference: (-675.7, -290.0)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.93 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 300
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Low-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 3438 3398 247
non 196 4770 5265 376
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1332
95% CI for difference: (-2216, -447)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.96 P-Value = 0.003 DF = 334

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 690 1209
88
non 196 957 1777 127
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -267
95% CI for difference: (-570, 37)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.73 P-Value = 0.085 DF = 344

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 869 1773 129
non 196 1170 1731 124
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -301
95% CI for difference: (-652, 49)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.69 P-Value = 0.092 DF = 382

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 1836 2054 149
non 196 2663 3499 250
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -827
95% CI for difference: (-1399, -254)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.84 P-Value = 0.005 DF = 316

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 641 1087 79
non 196 769 1290 92
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -128
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95% CI for difference: (-366, 111)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.05 P-Value = 0.292 DF = 376

Two-sample T for Cloud Base

Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 390 698 51
non 196 529 982 70
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -138.9
95% CI for difference: (-309.0, 31.2)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.61 P-Value = 0.109 DF = 352

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 527 1055 77
non 196 748 1203 86
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -221
95% CI for difference: (-447, 6)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.92 P-Value = 0.056 DF = 380
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APPENDIX J
T-TESTS COMPARING PRE-TRAINING FIXATION DURATION
BETWEEN GROUPS

High-time Pilots vs. Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 506 168 13
low 190 516 143 10
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -10.1
95% CI for difference: (-42.0, 21.9)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.62 P-Value = 0.536 DF = 351

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 543 212 21
low 90 545 173 18
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -1.5
95% CI for difference: (-56.6, 53.6)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.05 P-Value = 0.957 DF = 186

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 531 217 22
low 107 506 181 17
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 24.6
95% CI for difference: (-30.4, 79.5)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.88 P-Value = 0.379 DF = 193

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 141 473 180 15
low 160 512 164 13
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -39.4
95% CI for difference: (-78.7, -0.0)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.97 P-Value = 0.050 DF = 285
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Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 95 527 267 27
low 96 531 192 20
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -3.5
95% CI for difference: (-70.0, 63.0)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.10 P-Value = 0.917 DF = 170

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 55 513 252 34
low 71 534 202 24
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -21.6
95% CI for difference: (-104.0, 60.8)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.52 P-Value = 0.604 DF = 101
Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 51 440 194 27
low 83 493 156 17
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -53.6
95% CI for difference: (-117.3, 10.1)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.67 P-Value = 0.098 DF = 89

High-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 506 168
13
non 196 387 124 8.9

Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 119.2
95% CI for difference: (89.0, 149.4)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 7.77 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 328

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 543 212 21
non 122 386 153 14
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Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 157.3
95% CI for difference: (107.4, 207.2)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 6.22 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 175

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 531 217 22
non 128 404 153 14
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 126.9
95% CI for difference: (76.4, 177.4)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.96 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 170

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 141 473 180 15
non 185 378 141 10
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 94.3
95% CI for difference: (58.1, 130.5)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.13 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 257

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 95 527 267 27
non 124 437 247 22
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 90.5
95% CI for difference: (21.0, 160.0)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.57 P-Value = 0.011 DF = 194

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 55 513 252 34
non 94 386 142 15
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 127.0
95% CI for difference: (53.3, 200.7)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.43 P-Value = 0.001 DF = 74

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group

N Mean StDev SE Mean
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hig 51 440 194 27
non 111 397 175 17
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 42.3
95% CI for difference: (-20.9, 105.6)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.33 P-Value = 0.187 DF = 88

Low-time Pilots vs. Non-pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 190 516 143
10
non 196 387 124 8.9

Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 129.3
95% CI for difference: (102.4, 156.1)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 9.48 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 373

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 90 545 173 18
non 122 386 153 14
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 158.8
95% CI for difference: (113.7, 203.9)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 6.95 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 177

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 107 506 181 17
non 128 404 153 14
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 102.3
95% CI for difference: (58.8, 145.9)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.63 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 208

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev Mean
low 160 512 164 13
non 185 378 141 10
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 133.7
95% CI for difference: (101.0, 166.3)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.05 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 315
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Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 96 531 192 20
non 124 437 247 22
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 94.0
95% CI for difference: (35.6, 152.5)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.17 P-Value = 0.002 DF = 217

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 71 534 202 24
non 94 386 142 15
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 148.6
95% CI for difference: (93.0, 204.2)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.29 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 119

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 83 493 156 17
non 111 397 175 17
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 96.0
95% CI for difference: (48.9, 143.0)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.03 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 186
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APPENDIX K
T-TESTS COMPARING PRE-TRAINING TIME TO
FIRST FIXATION BETWEEN GROUPS
High-time Pilots vs. Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 180 685 1063
79
low 190 737 2137 155
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -52
95% CI for difference: (-394, 291)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.30 P-Value = 0.767 DF = 280

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 2488 3441 344
low
90 3089 4313 455
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -601
95% CI for difference: (-1727, 524)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.05 P-Value = 0.293 DF = 170

Two-sample T for Sky
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 1922 1818 182
low
107 3153 6982 675
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -1231
95% CI for difference: (-2615, 153)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.76 P-Value = 0.081 DF = 121

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 141 994 1503 127
low
160 1391 4427 350
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -397
95% CI for difference: (-1131, 337)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.07 P-Value = 0.287 DF = 199

Two-sample T for Horizon
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Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig
95 2274 3038 312
low
250 2300 5794 366
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -26
95% CI for difference: (-972, 921)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.05 P-Value = 0.958 DF = 309

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 55 2372 2570 346
low
71 3561 7012 832
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -1189
95% CI for difference: (-2980, 601)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.32 P-Value = 0.190 DF = 92

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 51 3050 3053 427
low
83 3457 6645 729
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -407
95% CI for difference: (-2081, 1266)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.48 P-Value = 0.631 DF = 124

High-time Pilots vs. Non-pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 483 700 1048 48
non 578 540 897 37
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 159.6
95% CI for difference: (40.7, 278.4)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.64 P-Value = 0.009 DF = 953
Two-sample T for Terrain
Group_2 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 2488 3441 344
non 122 2596 2305 209

Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -108
95% CI for difference: (-903, 686)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.27 P-Value = 0.788 DF = 166
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Two-sample T for Cloud
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 141 994 1503 127
non 185 1158 1667 123
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -164
95% CI for difference: (-511, 183)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.93 P-Value = 0.353 DF = 314

Two-sample T for Sky
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 100 1922 1818 182
non 128 1959 2861 253
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -37
95% CI for difference: (-651, 577)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.12 P-Value = 0.905 DF = 217

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig
95 2274 3038 312
non 124 2505 2436 219
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -230
95% CI for difference: (-982, 521)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.60 P-Value = 0.546 DF = 176

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 55 2372 2570 346
non 94 2418 2660 274
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -46
95% CI for difference: (-922, 829)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.11 P-Value = 0.917 DF = 116

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig
51 3050 3053 427
non 111 2629 4593 436
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 421
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95% CI for difference: (-786, 1629)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.69 P-Value = 0.491 DF = 139

Low-time Pilots vs. Non-pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
558 676 1486 63
non 578 540 897 37
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 135.6
95% CI for difference: (-7.9, 279.1)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.85 P-Value = 0.064 DF = 909

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
90 3089 4313 455
non 122 2596 2305 209
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 493
95% CI for difference: (-497, 1483)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.99 P-Value = 0.326 DF = 126

Two-sample T for Sky
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
107 3153 6982 675
non 128 1959 2861
253
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 1194
95% CI for difference: (-232, 2619)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.66 P-Value = 0.100 DF = 135

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
160 1391 4427 350
non 185 1158 1667 123
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 233
95% CI for difference: (-498, 964)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.63 P-Value = 0.531 DF = 197

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
96 3692 7218 737
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non

124 2505 2436

219

Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 1187
95% CI for difference: (-336, 2710)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.54 P-Value = 0.125 DF = 111

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
71 3561 7012 832
non 94 2418 2660 274
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 1143
95% CI for difference: (-599, 2885)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.30 P-Value = 0.196 DF = 85

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group_1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
low
83 3457 6645 729
non 111 2629 4593 436
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: 828
95% CI for difference: (-852, 2509)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.97 P-Value = 0.331 DF = 137
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APPENDIX L
T-TESTS COMPARING POST-TRAINING FIXATION
COUNTS BETWEEN GROUPS
High-time Pilots vs. Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 5.40 4.90 0.39
low 181 6.20 5.76 0.43
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.803
95% CI for difference: (-1.944, 0.337)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.39 P-Value = 0.167 DF = 335

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 1.15 2.04 0.16
low 181 0.92 1.67 0.12
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.230
95% CI for difference: (-0.173, 0.633)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.12 P-Value = 0.262 DF = 301

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 2.01 2.68 0.21
low 181 2.03 2.73 0.20
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.021
95% CI for difference: (-0.602, 0.559)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.07 P-Value = 0.943 DF = 330

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 2.23 2.54 0.20
low 181 3.22 3.96 0.29
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.992
95% CI for difference: (-1.695, -0.288)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.77 P-Value = 0.006 DF = 310
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Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 1.40 2.10 0.17
low 181 1.17 1.96 0.15
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: 0.230
95% CI for difference: (-0.207, 0.667)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.04 P-Value = 0.301 DF = 321

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 0.529 0.896 0.071
low 181 0.77 1.22 0.090
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.239
95% CI for difference: (-0.466, -0.013)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.08 P-Value = 0.039 DF = 327

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 0.50 1.05 0.084
low 181 0.83 1.53 0.11
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (low)
Estimate for difference: -0.337
95% CI for difference: (-0.616, -0.059)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.38 P-Value = 0.018 DF = 319

High-time Pilots vs. Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 5.40 4.90 0.39
non 192 9.14 7.19 0.52
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -3.739
95% CI for difference: (-5.018, -2.461)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.75 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 336

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 1.15 2.04 0.16
non 192 1.58 2.58 0.19
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.430
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95% CI for difference: (-0.917, 0.056)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.74 P-Value = 0.083 DF = 346
Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 2.01 2.68 0.21
non 192 2.34 2.97 0.21
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.337
95% CI for difference: (-0.933, 0.258)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.11 P-Value = 0.266 DF = 343

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 2.23 2.54 0.20
non 192 5.17 5.67 0.41
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -2.937
95% CI for difference: (-3.836, -2.039)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6.44 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 275

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 1.40 2.10 0.17
non 192 1.42 1.61 0.12
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.015
95% CI for difference: (-0.417, 0.386)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.08 P-Value = 0.940 DF = 287

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 0.529 0.896 0.071
non 192 0.99 1.37 0.099
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.466
95% CI for difference: (-0.706, -0.226)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.83 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 332

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
hig 157 0.50 1.05 0.084
non 192 1.35 2.12 0.15
Difference = mu (hig) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.857
95% CI for difference: (-1.201, -0.514)
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T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.91 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 291

Low-time Pilots vs. Non-pilots
Two-sample T for All
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 6.20 5.76 0.43
non 192 9.14 7.19 0.52
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -2.936
95% CI for difference: (-4.259, -1.613)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.36 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 361

Two-sample T for Terrain
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 0.92 1.67 0.12
non 192 1.58 2.58 0.19
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.661
95% CI for difference: (-1.101, -0.220)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.95 P-Value = 0.003 DF = 329

Two-sample T for Sky
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 2.03 2.73 0.20
non 192 2.34 2.97 0.21
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.316
95% CI for difference: (-0.897, 0.264)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.07 P-Value = 0.285 DF = 370

Two-sample T for Cloud
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 3.22 3.96 0.29
non 192 5.17 5.67 0.41
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -1.946
95% CI for difference: (-2.937, -0.954)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.86 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 342

Two-sample T for Horizon
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 1.17 1.96 0.15
non 192 1.42 1.61 0.12
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Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.245
95% CI for difference: (-0.612, 0.121)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.32 P-Value = 0.189 DF = 348

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 0.77 1.22 0.090
non 192 0.99 1.37 0.099
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.227
95% CI for difference: (-0.490, 0.036)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.70 P-Value = 0.091 DF = 369

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 0.77 1.22 0.090
non 192 0.99 1.37 0.099
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.227
95% CI for difference: (-0.490, 0.036)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.70 P-Value = 0.091 DF = 369

Two-sample T for Darkness
Group N Mean StDev SE Mean
low 181 0.83 1.53 0.11
non 192 1.35 2.12 0.15
Difference = mu (low) - mu (non)
Estimate for difference: -0.520
95% CI for difference: (-0.895, -0.144)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.72 P-Value = 0.007 DF = 347
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APPENDIX M
T-TESTS COMPARING FIXATION COUNTS BEFORE
AND AFTER TRAINING WITHIN GROUPS

High-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 5.71 6.17 0.46
2
157 5.40 4.90 0.39
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.304
95% CI for difference: (-0.883, 1.491)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.50 P-Value = 0.614 DF = 332

Two-sample T for Terrain
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 1.31 1.87 0.14
2
157 1.15 2.04 0.16
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.158
95% CI for difference: (-0.264, 0.580)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.74 P-Value = 0.461 DF = 319

Two-sample T for Sky
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 1.62 2.42 0.18
2
157 2.01 2.68 0.21
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: -0.384
95% CI for difference: (-0.935, 0.167)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.37 P-Value = 0.171 DF = 317

Two-sample T for Cloud
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 2.78 3.77 0.28
2
157 2.23 2.54 0.20
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.554
95% CI for difference: (-0.127, 1.235)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.60 P-Value = 0.111 DF = 315
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Two-sample T for Horizon
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 1.32 2.08 0.15
2
157 1.40 2.10 0.17

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: -0.085
95% CI for difference: (-0.533, 0.364)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.37 P-Value = 0.711 DF = 327

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 0.74 1.85 0.14
2
157 0.529 0.896 0.071
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.216
95% CI for difference: (-0.090, 0.521)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.39 P-Value = 0.165 DF = 266

Two-sample T for Darkness
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
180 0.63 1.48 0.11
2
157 0.50 1.05 0.084

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.137
95% CI for difference: (-0.136, 0.409)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.98 P-Value = 0.326 DF = 322

Low-time Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 6.52 5.83 0.42
2
181 6.20 5.76 0.43
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.311
95% CI for difference: (-0.872, 1.495)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.52 P-Value = 0.605 DF = 368

Two-sample T for Terrain
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 1.25 2.10 0.15
2
181 0.92 1.67 0.12
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Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.325
95% CI for difference: (-0.062, 0.711)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.65 P-Value = 0.099 DF = 357

Two-sample T for Sky
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 1.59 2.62 0.19
2
181 2.03 2.73 0.20
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: -0.438
95% CI for difference: (-0.986, 0.109)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.57 P-Value = 0.116 DF = 366

Two-sample T for Cloud
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 3.61 3.83 0.28
2
181 3.22 3.96 0.29
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.390
95% CI for difference: (-0.407, 1.186)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.96 P-Value = 0.337 DF = 366

Two-sample T for Horizon
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 1.16 1.72 0.12
2
181 1.17 1.96 0.15
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: -0.013
95% CI for difference: (-0.391, 0.364)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.07 P-Value = 0.944 DF = 357
Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 0.73 1.20 0.087
2
181 0.77 1.22 0.090

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: -0.036
95% CI for difference: (-0.283, 0.211)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.29 P-Value = 0.772 DF = 367

Two-sample T for Darkness
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Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
190 1.02 1.91 0.14
2
181 0.83 1.53 0.11

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.187
95% CI for difference: (-0.166, 0.539)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.04 P-Value = 0.298 DF = 358

Non-Pilots
Two-sample T for All
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 11.8 11.8 0.84
2
192 9.14 7.19 0.52
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 2.706
95% CI for difference: (0.759, 4.652)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.73 P-Value = 0.007 DF = 322

Two-sample T for Terrain
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 2.32 3.74 0.27
2
192 1.58 2.58 0.19
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.740
95% CI for difference: (0.099, 1.381)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.27 P-Value = 0.024 DF = 345

Two-sample T for Sky
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 2.78 3.71 0.27
2
192 2.34 2.97 0.21

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.441
95% CI for difference: (-0.230, 1.112)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.29 P-Value = 0.197 DF = 369

Two-sample T for Cloud
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 6.72 8.27 0.59
2
192 5.17 5.67 0.41
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 1.556
95% CI for difference: (0.141, 2.972)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.16 P-Value = 0.031 DF = 343
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Two-sample T for Horizon
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 1.73 2.48 0.18
2
192 1.42 1.61 0.12

Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.317
95% CI for difference: (-0.101, 0.734)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.49 P-Value = 0.137 DF = 333

Two-sample T for Cloud Base
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 1.29 2.13 0.15
2
192 0.99 1.37 0.099
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.298
95% CI for difference: (-0.059, 0.654)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.64 P-Value = 0.102 DF = 331

Two-sample T for Darkness
Condition N Mean StDev SE Mean
1
195 1.82 2.67 0.19
2
192 1.35 2.12 0.15
Difference = mu (1) - mu (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.466
95% CI for difference: (-0.015, 0.948)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.91 P-Value = 0.057 DF = 368
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